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This Article analyzes how Delaware uses its market power in the market for
incorporations to increase its profits through price discrimination. Price dis-
crimination entails charging different prices to different consumers according
to their willingness to pay. Two features of Delaware law constitute price
discrimination. First, Delaware's uniquely structured franchise-tax schedule
assesses a higher tax to public than to nonpublic firms. Second, Delaware's
litigation-intensive corporate law effectively price discriminates among firms
according to the level of their involvement in corporate disputes. From the
perspective of social welfare, tax discrimination is likely to enhance efficiency.
By contrast, price discrimination through litigation-intensive corporate law
is likely to reduce efficiency.
INTRODUCTION
The competition among states in selling corporate laws to firms
has long been the subject of extensive legal scholarship.' According
1 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FisCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUMTURE OF
CORpoRATE LAW (1991); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable
Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1435, 1461-70 (1992); Lucian
Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race to Protect Managers from
Takeovers, 99 COLuM. L. REv. 1168 (1999); Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law 7ivial?: A
Political and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 542 (1990); William L. Cary, Federalism and
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to conventional wisdom, states compete in the market for incorpora-
dons by tailoring their laws to the taste of corporate decision makers.
Since Delaware has for many years been more successful than any
other state in attracting incorporations, its law is taken to epitomize
what corporate decision makers want.2
Within this analytical framework, the views about state competi-
tion and the quality of law that it produces cover a wide spectrum.
William Cary claimed that competition for incorporations is bad be-
cause corporate legal rules unduly benefit managers at the expense of
shareholders.3 Ralph Winter, and more recently Roberta Romano,
Frank Easterbrook, and Daniel Fischel, argue that competition is good
because it induces states to devise corporate laws that maximize firm
value.4 Lucian Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell contend that state competi-
tion is sometimes good and sometimes bad, depending on the issue
involved.5 And Bernard Black suggests that competition does not re-
ally matter because it results in laws that are market mimicking, avoid-
able by advance planning, changeable by political forces when they
matter, or simply unimportant. 6
One issue that until recently has remained surprisingly unex-
plored, however, is the tension between Delaware's prolonged domi-
nance of the market for incorporations and the assumption that this
market is competitive and thus serves the interests of corporate deci-
sion makers. To be sure, commentators have acknowledged Dela-
Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YaIE lJ. 663 (1974); Robert Daines, Difs Dda-
ware Law Improve Firm Value?, J. FiN. ECON. (forthcoming 2002), available at http://
jfe.rochester.edu/2k488.pdf; Melin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Lau, 89
COLUM. L REv. 1461, 1512-12 (1989); Daniel R. Fischel, The Race to the Bottom" Revisited:
Reflections on Recent Developments in Ddaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L REx. 913 (1982);
Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Neiwodis of Contractds 81 'A. L RE'. 757,
841-51 (1995); Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Putle, 1
J.L EcoN. & ORG. 225 (1985); Ralph K. WinterJr., State Lau, Sharholder Protection, and the
Theory of the Corporation, 6J. LEx..L SrUD. 251 (1977).
2 See ROBERTA RoNuao, THE GENIUs OF A.E tuaN CowO.nTE Lw 9 (1993) ("[1]f
Delaware is not the pioneer for a corporate law innovation, it is among the first to
imitate.").
3 See,& g., Cary, supra note 1, at 663-68, 705 (arguing that competition leads to a race
for the bottom, in which states adopt corporate laws that offer benefits to management at
the expense of shareholder protections).
4 See, e-g., Fschel, supra note 1, at 913-20 (arguing that competition results in a race
to the top); Romano, supra note 1, at 233-79 (presenting empirical evidence suggesting
that state competition results in a race to the top); Winter, supra note 1, at 27-4-75 (arguing
that capital markets induce companies to incorporate in "those states ,'hich offer tie opti-
mal yield to both shareholders and management," because othenvise the company would
not attract or retain investors).
5 See Bebchuk, supra note 1, at 1458-84 (arguing that state competition leads to pro-
management rules when management gains represent a high fraction of shareholder
losses); Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 1, at 1172-78 (arguing that state competition for
incorporations leads to pro-management takeover laws).
6 See Black, supra note 1, passim (arguing that corporate law is trivial).
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ware's dominance and noted the competitive advantages that give rise
to it. 7 But apart from passing references to the fact that these advan-
tages furnish Delaware with market power, they have said little about
its potential uses.8
Recently, the simple view underlying this first generation of state
competition scholarship has been giving way to a more realistic one
that takes account of the complexities of the market for incorpora-
tions. The thrust of the second generation of state competition schol-
arship is that, if the market paradigm is to be taken seriously, it must
reflect the various imperfections that characterize markets in reality.
Thus, Michael Klausner, by himself and with one of us, has argued
that, as a result of network and learning externalities, competition for
incorporations among states may not yield optimal law either to share-
holders or to managers.9 Building on this work, the other of us has
argued that a corporate law that grants courts broad discretion ex-
cludes other states from Delaware's network externalities, and there-
fore it may develop even if it is not optimal. 10
In this Article, we explore a different way in which the imperfec-
tions in the market for incorporations manifest themselves. We argue
that Delaware exploits its market power through price discrimination.
Price discrimination involves charging different prices to different
consumers according to their willingness to pay in order to increase
profits. We discuss two features of Delaware's corporate law that have
a discriminatory effect: its franchise-tax formula and the litigation-in-
tensive structure of its substantive law.
7 See, e.g., id. at 589-90 (discussing Delaware's expertjudiciary); Klausner, supra note
1, at 841-47 (discussing network externalities associated with Delaware law); Romano, supra
note 1, at 276-78 (discussing Delaware's substantive law, its judiciary, and its commitment
to innovation).
8 A notable exception is the recognition by various commentators that Delaware
charges a premium for its law. See, e.g.,Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, "'Jnbard an
Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TFX. L. Rxv. 469, 491-98 (1987) (examin-
ing Delaware's profits from the incorporation business); Romano, supra note 1, at 240-12
(same).
9 See Klausner, supra note 1, at 842-47; see also Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path
Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74
WAsH. U. L.Q. 347 (1996) [hereinafter Kahan & Klausner, Path Dependence] (relating net-
work and learning effects to agency problems and cognitive biases); Marcel Kahan &
Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or "The Economics
of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. RPv. 713, 750-51, 760-61 (1997) [hereinafter Kahan & Klausner,
Economics of Boilerplate (expanding the analysis and empirically testing the presence of
network and learning benefits).
10 See Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Lazi, 98
COLUM. L. Rxv. 1908 (1998) (arguing that legal indeterminacy prevents other states from
tapping Delaware's learning and network externalities through emulation of Delaware law,
accentuates the judicial expertise that has developed in Delaware, makes Delaware's com-
mitment to corporate chartering more credible, and increases the costs for firms already
incorporated in Delaware of reincorporating elsewhere).
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In Part I we lay out the analytical foundation for our claim that
Delaware engages in price discrimination by showing that Delawrare
has substantial market power in the market for incorporations and by
discussing how a producer with market power can employ price dis-
crimination to increase profits.
In Part II, we examine two features of Delaware law. First, we
show that Delaware uses its uniquely structured franchise tax to
charge a higher incorporation price to public corporations than it
does to nonpublic corporations, and that among public corporations,
it charges a higher price to larger corporations than it does to smaller
ones. Second, we argue that Delaware's corporate law is litigation in-
tensive, which has the effect of charging a higher price to corpora-
tions that have a greater involvement in corporate disputes.
Both of these practices function as price discrimination devices
because they track important proxies for the value firms place on in-
corporating in Delaware. Yet-with the possible exception of tax dif-
ferences among public firms-they do not reflect cost differences of
serving different companies. With respect to the franchise tax, the
ratio of taxes payable by public firms to taxes payable by nonpublic
firms exceeds the cost ratio of serving these firms." With respect to
litigation intensiveness, this product design is in itself price discrimi-
natory even if, given this design, the ratio of the rents that Delaware
extracts from firms through litigation to the costs it incurs in proiid-
ing litigation services is the same for all firms.12
In Part III, we analyze the normative implications of Delaware's
price discrimination. We argue that Delaware's franchise tax probably
increases social welfare by enabling more firms to benefit from using
Delaware law. By contrast, Delawvare's litigation-intensive substantive
law probably decreases social welfare by making the advantages of us-
ing Delaware law smaller than they could be.
I
DELAWARE'S MARKET PONVER AND THE THEORY OF
PRICE DISCRIMINATION
In this Part, we review the economic theory of price discrimina-
tion and examine its applicability to the market for incorporations.
We proceed in two steps. First, we show that Delaware possesses sub-
stantial market power in the market for incorporations. Second, we
consider how producers with market power can increase their profits
through price discrimination.
11 See infra Part II.A.2(c).
12 See infra Part II.B.2(c).
2001] 1209
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
A. Delaware's Market Power
The choice of an incorporation state has several consequences.
First, the corporation law of the state becomes the law that governs
the internal affairs of the corporation. 13 Second, the courts of the
state acquire personal jurisdiction over the corporation and its direc-
tors in disputes related to its internal affairs. 14 Third, the corporation
becomes a user of the state's administrative services, which include
obtaining corporate certificates, making corporate filings, and paying
corporate franchise tax. These three consequences-applicability of
the state's law, availability of the state's courts, and use of the state's
administrative services-are the product that states provide in the
market for incorporations.
In this market, Delaware is the most important domicile for pub-
licly traded corporations. At present, about half of all public corpora-
tions in the United States are incorporated in Delaware. No other
state accounts for more than five percent of public corporations. 15
Moreover, most of the corporations not incorporated in Delaware are
incorporated in the state where they are headquartered. 16 These facts
by themselves suggest that there is something special about Delaware
in the market for incorporations. In this subpart, we argue that Dela-
ware's preeminence is the result of competitive advantages, and that
these advantages give Delaware market power-the ability to charge a
premium for its law. We first present empirical evidence of Dela-
ware's market power. We then examine the competitive advantages
that are the basis for this market power.
1. Evidence of Delaware's Market Power
In competitive markets, producers have to sell their goods at a
price equal to the marginal cost of production and earn zero eco-
nomic profit.'7 In markets that are not competitive, some producers
13 MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS AsSOCIATIONS 101
(8th ed. unabridged 2000).
14 See, e.g., DEL- CODEANN. tit. 10, §§ 3111, 3114 (1991). Aplaintiff, however, can also
bring a corporate dispute in another court as long as that court has subject matter and
personaljurisdiction. Arguably, a corporation incorporated in another state could provide
in its charter that all claims related to its internal affairs be brought in courts in a state
other than its state of incorporation. We are unaware of any corporation that has included
such a clause in its charter, and unsure whether a state court would acceptjurisdiction over
a dispute with such tangential ties to the state.
15 John C. Coates IV, An Index for the Contestability of Corporate Control: Studying
Variation in Legal Takeover Vulnerability 29 (July 17, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with authors); see also Del. Div. of Corps., Home Page, at http://ivww.state.de.us/corp/
index.htm (last updated May 30, 2001) (reporting that 50% of the companies listed on the
New York Stock Exchange are chartered in Delaware).
16 See Robert Daines, The Demand for Corporate Law (2000) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with authors).
17 See infra Part I.B.1.
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possess market power, which is defined as the ability to charge more
for a product than its marginal cost.'8 Since charging more for a
product than its marginal cost is a condition for earning a profit, the
ability to earn a profit over an extended period of time is evidence
that a producer has market power.' 9
On this metric, it is evident that Delaware possesses substantial
market power. Over the past thirty-five years,20 Delaware appropri-
ated less than three percent of its franchise-tax revenues to cover the
costs of operating its chartering business, 2' including the cost of run-
ning the Division of Corporations, the Delaware Court of Chancery,
and the Delaware Supreme Court, 2 2 and thus earned profit margins of
several thousand percent. In dollar terms, Delaware's franchise-tax
revenues averaged $275 million per year on average outlays of $7.33
million in the 1990s, $113 million per year on average outlays of $3.4
million in the 1980s, $55 million per year on average outlays of $1.03
million in the 1970s, and $18 million per year on average outlays of
$0.57 million in the 1960s.23 Clearly, Delaware's economic profits are
substantial and have persisted for several decades.
18 DErtcs W. CARLTON &JEFR E ML PERLOFF, MODERN INDISTRLXL ORcQ',, ' o -O 137
(2d ed. 1994).
19 Joe S. Bain, The Profit Rate as a Measure of Monopoy Pown; 55 QJ. Eco.. 271, 274
(1941); see alsoA.P. Lerner, The Concept of Monopoly and the Measlrenta of Monopoly PWer, 1
REv. EcoN. STUD. 157 (1934) (using price markup to measure market power).
20 Delaware's market power probably dates back more than thirtyive years. While we
do not have data on the costs that Delaware incurred in sering chartered firns for the first
half of the twentieth century from which to estimate Delaware's profits, the available data
on Delaware's tax revenue strongly suggest that its market power was by then well estab-
lished. Between 1915 and 1934, Delaware's corporate revenue averaged 35.8% of its total
revenue, RussELL C. LRcio, THE DELWARE CORPORATION 167 thl.Dr (1937), and Dela-
ware's share of incorporations among publicly traded companies increased significantly, id.
at 175 tbl.VI, 176 tbl.VII. It seems unlikely that the cost to Delaware of serving its chartered
firms kept pace with the rapidly increasing revenues from incorporations. However, Dela-
ware's expanding market did not go unchallenged in that period. In the 1940s, over thirty
states revised their corporation laws to match Delaware's, causing Delaware's percentage of
franchise-tax revenues of total state revenues to decline from a high of 42.5% in 1929 to a
low of 7.2% in 1955. SeeJoel Seligman, A Brief isto.r of Dclazare's General Corporation Law of
1899, 1 DEL-J. CORP. L 249, 279 &- n.153 (1976). In the 1960s, Delaware launched an
ambitious program of modernizing its entire corporate law and marketing it aggressively to
corporate counsel nationwide. Since then Delaware's incorporation revenues have steadily
increased, totaling more than 20% of the state revenues in 1996. Roberta Romano, Empau-
eringInvestors: A Matet Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 Y.e LJ. 2359 app. at 2429 tbL1
(1998).
21 See Romano, supra note 20, app. at 2429 tbl.1.
22 Id.
23 Id. app. at 2429 (reporting data from 1966 through 1996). As we explain below,
most of Delaware's franchise-tax revenues reflect the price of incorporating in Delaware
rather than the price of conducting business in the state. 1%'ile some other states also
derive substantial net revenues from their franchise tax, those revenues do not result from
incorporating in those states but rather from doing business in them. Sre infra Part II.A.1.
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2. Sources of Delaware's Market Power
Delaware's ability to charge a premium for incorporation is tied
to the three facets of the product that Delaware is selling: substantive
law, a forum for litigating disputes, and administrative services.
First, Delaware boasts a well-developed corporate case law. Be-
cause many corporate disputes arise under Delaware law, Delaware's
case law is more developed than the case law of other states. The
greater predictability that accompanies a highly evolved case law helps
corporate actors plan transactions and reduces legal risk.24 In addi-
tion, most national law firms have developed the expertise to advise
their clients expediently on matters of Delaware corporate law.25 The
ease with which corporations can obtain legal advice on Delaware law
reduces the costs of undertaking corporate transactions.2 6 Similarly,
the financial community's familiarity with Delaware law reduces the
cost of analyzing and pricing its effect on corporate securities. Lower-
ing these costs benefits corporations by reducing their cost of
capital.2 7
Second, Delaware courts are a desirable forum for litigating cor-
porate disputes. When a corporate dispute arises, the ability to resolve
the dispute quickly and sensibly is critical. This is where Delaware
really shines. In Delaware, the chancery court has original jurisdiction
over most corporate disputes.28 Because the chancery court also has
limited subject matter jurisdiction, 29 its docket consists mostly of cor-
porate claims and its members decide cases withoutjuries.30 Members
of the court thus have ample opportunity to develop expertise on mat-
ters of Delaware corporate law and have developed a national reputa-
tion for handling cases expeditiously. As a result, Delaware's chancery
court is one of the most highly regarded courts in the country.31
24 See Kamar, supra note 10, at 1923-24 (discussing network benefits generated by case
law); Klausner, supra note 1, at 844-47 (same); Romano, supra note 1, at 276-77 (discussing
the benefits generated by the large volume of Delaware cases).
25 David A. Skeel,Jr., The Unanimity Norm in Delaware Corporate Law, 83 VA. L. Rwv. 127,
161 (1997) (noting the experience of prominent New York law firms in Delaware corpo-
rate law).
26 Klausner, supra note 1, at 846.
27 Id. at 785.
28 Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts in Resolving
Business Disputes, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 1, 5-8 (1995).
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 See, e.g., William H. Rebnquist, The Prominence of the Delaware Court of Chanciy in the
State-FederalJoint Venture of ProvidingJustice, 48 Bus. LAw. 351, 354-55 (1992).
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Third, on a day-to-day basis, incorporation in Delaware gives cor-
porations access to the state's efficient filing, registration, and other
administrative services.3 2
Fourth, Delaware is said to be uniquely committed to corporate
needs. This commitment arguably derives from the substantial reve-
nue historically generated by Delaware's franchise tax and the con-
comitant pressure to maintain this revenue stream.3 3 Corporations
value this commitment inasmuch as it reduces the likelihood of hav-
ing to reincorporate in another state should Delaware law become less
attractive in the future.3 4
The significance of the factors underlying Delaware's substantial
market power should be assessed in light of the fact that entry into the
market for incorporations is restricted to states of the United States
and foreign countries. Several states and many foreign countries suf-
fer from competitive disadvantages-an inconvenient geographic lo-
cation, nonautomatic recognition of theirjudgments in United States
courts, language barriers, or a negative political reputation-that
hamper their ability to attract incorporations. Of the remaining juris-
dictions, none has made a determined effort to compete with Dela-
ware.35  This failure to compete may be attributed to political
constraints, inattentiveness, or a perception that Delaware's competi-
32 See, e.g., CARTER S. CoLEs, 5 COURT TECNiroLoca "PoRwOTS DocvtF"\-r l-Lt,%GWG, at
app. A-1 (National Ctr. for State Courts, Publication No. R-173, 1995), at http://-.vncsc.
dni.us/ncsc/ctr/appndx_l.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2001) (praising the Delaware Division
of Corporations imaging system). Delaware's market share may also enable the state to
enjoy scale economies in rendering administrative and adjudicatory services.
33 Romano, supra note 1, at 276 (stating that Delaware is "captive to demand by virtue
of the revenues collected from incorporated firms"). In fiscal year 2002, Delmare's esti-
mated revenues from its franchise tax will be $557.6 million, constituting 22.7% of the state
budget. Office of the Governor, State of Del., Financial Oeriw. THucal Year 200Z at 4, at
http://wvv.state.de.us/budget/fy2002/finover.pdf (last revisedJan. 3, 2001). Delaare's
commitment is further enhanced by the dependence of the local corporate bar on incor-
porations. See Romano, supra note 1, at 241. A lesser-known aspect of Delaware's invest-
ment in legal capital is its developed industry of corporate service companies. Se Macey &
Miller, supra note 8, at 503. Delaware law requires all chartered firms to be represented in
the state by a local registered agent. See D.L. CODE AzN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(2) (1991). The
Delaware Division of Corporations refers firms without Delaware offices to a list of 112
registered agents. Del. Div. of Corps., Registered Agent% at http://v%-,.state.de.tis/corp/
agents/agt2.htm (last updated Feb. 15, 2001).
34 SeeRomano, supra note 1, at 24849 (arguing that reincorporation costs tie corpora-
tions to their domicile and are positively correlated with the size of the firm). But seBlack,
supra note 1, at 586-88 (arguing that reincorporation costs are low and a credible commit-
ment is therefore not a significant advantage).
35 For example, none of the three states frequently mentioned as competing with
Delaware in the market for incorporations-Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Virginia-have in-
stituted a specialized court modeled after the Delaware Court of Chancery. Se, e.g.,
Douglas J. Cumming & Jeffrey G. Macintosh, The Role of Interjurisdietional Competition in
Shaping Canadian Corporate Law, 20 IWr'L REv. L & Eco\,. 141, 147 (2000) (mentioning
Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Virginia). For a discussion of tie failed attempts to establish
such a court in Pennsylvania, see infra text accompanying notes 171-75.
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tive advantages are too formidable to overcome. At any rate, the lack
of a serious competitor allows Delaware to raise its price for
incorporations.
We should note, however, that Delaware's superiority does not
necessarily mean that its law is optimal.3 6 In fact, as we suggest below,
Delaware law is likely to be suboptimal in precisely the areas where it
is superior to the laws of other states.3 7 Thus, Delaware's expert judi-
ciary and wealth of legal precedents render its law more predictable
than the laws of other states, but not as predictable as it could be if its
precedents were more clear.38 Similarly, the widespread use of Dela-
ware law leads to greater familiarity among legal and financial profes-
sionals, but this level of familiarity could be further enhanced with
more determinate law. In the same vein, Delaware's commitment to
corporate needs guarantees that it will keep its law competitive with
other states' laws, but does not guarantee that its law will be optimal.A9
In sum, while Delaware law is predictable and clear in comparison to
the laws of other states, it does not live up to its unique potential for
predictability and clarity that is generated by its vast body of prece-
dents and its specialized trial court.
B. The Theory of Price Discrimination
Delaware can take advantage of its market power to increase
profit in various ways. Most simply, it can-and in fact does-price an
incorporation in Delaware at a premium above marginal cost.40 We
argue, however, that Delaware not only charges a premium for incor-
poration, but also engages in price discrimination by tailoring that
premium to the benefits that different firms derive from incorporat-
ing in Delaware. In order to inform our discussion of Delaware's
price discrimination, we briefly present the theory of price discrimina-
tion and discuss how it functions in the marketplace.
36 The economic literature recognizes that producers offering a superior product
may even intentionally damage their product to extract more consumer surplus through
price discrimination. See, e.g., RaymondJ. Deneckere & R. Preston McAfee, Damaged Goods,
5J. ECON. & MG-xr. STRATEGY 149, 169 (1996). In Delaware's case, we will argue, the dam-
age is not intentional. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
37 See infra Part II.B.1.
38 See Kamar, supra note 10, at 1913-14.
39 See RomANo, supra note 2, at 148. Because the profitability of Delaware's chartering
business animates the state's commitment to firms, increasing profits from incorporations
by offering even suboptimal litigation-intensive law may actually strengthen Delaware's
commitment. Delaware's commitment to firms is no different from any other quality ad-
vantage that a producer enjoys. In either case, superiority does not translate into
optimality.
40 See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 8, at 491-92; Romano, supra note 1, at 240-41.
1214 [Vol. 86:1205
PRICE DISCPJMINATION
1. Competitive and Monopoly Pricing
In perfectly competitive markets, producers sell products at a
price equal to the marginal cost of production. 41 Because any prod-
uct in such a market has perfect substitutes, competition drives the
price down to the lowest level at which producers are willing to manu-
facture and sell the product 42 That price equals the cost of produc-
ing the last unit sold, or the marginal cost.43
In contrast, producers with market power can increase their prof-
its by charging a price above marginal cost. Market power exists
whenever a producer offers a product that has only imperfect substi-
tutes. A producer in such a market need not fear competition by ri-
vals offering an identical product, and can therefore set prices high
enough to earn positive economic profits.44
2. Price Discrimination
While monopoly pricing is more profitable than competitive pric-
ing, a producer with market power can further increase profits by en-
gaging in price discrimination. Price discrimination occurs when a
producer charges a higher price to consumers with a higher willing-
ness to pay and a lower price to consumers with a lower willingness to
pay. Products do not have to be identical in order for their sale to
different consumers at different prices to be discriminatory. What dis-
tinguishes price discrimination from regular price differences be-
tween products in competitive markets is that price discrimination is
the sale of products by the same producer at prices that are in differ-
ent ratios to marginal costs of production.45 Thus, the sale of a book
in hardcover for three times the price of a paperback version is pre-
sumably price discrimination because-although the books are not
identical-the binding costs do not explain the price difference.46
Economists distinguish between three types of price discrimina-
tion: first-degree, second-degree, and third-degree.47 For ease of expo-
sition, we start by explaining first-degree price discrimination, then
41 CARLTON & PERFLOFF, supra note 18, at 89.
42 Id. at 87-89.
43 Id. at 89. Competitive pricing does not depend on the actual existence of perfect
substitutes. It suffices that such substitutes could potentially be offered by new producers
facing no entry barriers. Id at 108-10.
44 Id.
45 See Louis PHUIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF PRICE DIscRmhs,%TIONx 6 (1983); GEonGE J.
S-nGLER, THE THEopx" OF PIuCE 210 (4th ed. 1987) ;Jp,%N TIRoLE, TiE TmiEoFv oF INDtS-r&L
ORGANIZATION 133-34 (1988); Hal R. Varian, PiceDiscrirninalion, in I H,* " DoOK OF INuDUs.
TL'AL ORGANIZATION 597-99 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
46 See STIGKER, supra note 45, at 210.
47 For accessible discussions of the literature on price discrimination, see C.aIro.N &
PER.RoFr, supra note 18, at 431-82; TiRoLE, supra note 45, at 133-52.
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address third-degree price discrimination, and conclude with a discus-
sion of second-degree price discrimination.
First-degree, or perfect, price discrimination is the most profita-
ble type of price discrimination because it extracts each consumer's
entire surplus.48 To engage in perfect price discrimination, however,
a producer must know the demand function of each consumer. Be-
cause producers are unlikely to possess this knowledge, perfect price
discrimination is virtually never used in the real world and primarily
serves as a benchmark for evaluating other pricing schemes.
Third-degree price discrimination is an imprecise version of per-
fect price discrimination. For a producer to engage in third-degree
price discrimination, the producer must be able to distinguish among
groups of consumers with different average willingness to pay. Unlike
perfect price discrimination, however, the producer cannot distin-
guish between consumers within the same group.49 The producer
therefore charges a low price to all consumers in the low-willingness-
to-pay group, and a high price to those in the high-willingness-to-pay
group.50 For example, a museum operator who knows that students
are generally less willing to pay for admission than other adults may
offer discounted student admission.
In the case of second-degree price discrimination, the producer
also knows that a certain group of consumers has on average a higher
willingness to pay than another group. The producer, however, can-
not tell to which group an individual consumer belongs. To distin-
guish between different groups of consumers, the producer can offer
different product-price packages that will induce each consumer to
select the package targeted to her group. An airline, for example,
may know that business travelers have a higher willingness to pay than
leisure travelers, but not whether a particular passenger is a business
or leisure traveler. To address this difficulty, the airline attempts to
distinguish between the two groups by offering a lower round-trip fare
for trips that include a weekend stay. Because leisure travelers, unlike
business travelers, rarely mind staying over the weekend, this pricing
48 TIROLE, supra note 45, at 135-37. In markets where consumers purchase no more
than one unit of the product, like the market for corporate charters, a producer can first-
degree price discriminate by charging to each consumer a price equal to the personal
surplus from consumption of a single unit. When consumers choose not only whether to
purchase the product but also how many units to purchase, the profit-maximizing strategy
is to set the price per unit equal to marginal cost and charge to each consumer an addi-
tional lump sum equal to her surplus. This drives consumers to purchase exactly the same
quantity of the product they would purchase in a competitive market but leaves them with
none of the surplus. Id. at 136.
49 Specifically, because differences between members of the same group are unob-
servable, the producer ignores them when pricing and instead treats each group as a sepa-
rate market.
50 TiRot, supra note 45, at 136.
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scheme enables the airline to charge a higher price to business trav-
elers than to leisure travelers.5 '
3. Applicability to the Market for Incorporations
Since Delaware has market power in the market for incorpora-
tions, it may be able to derive higher profits if it engages in price dis-
crimination. To engage in effective price discrimination, Delaware
must be able to distinguish between consumers according to their will-
ingness to pay and limit resale by consumers paying the lower price to
those who would pay the higher price.5 2 The latter condition for
price discrimination is clearly met in the incorporation market be-
cause companies cannot resell incorporations. How Delaware distin-
guishes among corporations according to their willingness to pay is
the topic of Part II.
II
How DEiAWARE PRICE DISCRIMINATES
In this Part, we examine two ways in which Delawrare relies on its
dominant position in the market for incorporations to engage in price
discrimination. First, Delaware employs a franchise-tax schedule that
results in higher charges to public companies than to nonpublic com-
panies.53 Second, the structure of Delaware's corporate law generates
a heightened level of litigation. This increases the costs to firms that
are more involved in legal disputes and the concomitant profits that
Delaware derives from those firms. The status of a firm as publicly
traded and the degree of its involvement in legal disputes are proxies
for the value it assigns to incorporating in Delaware. By charging a
higher price to firms that tend to attribute a greater value to incorpo-
51 See generally Michael Mussa & Sherwin Rosen, Monopoly and Product Quality, 18 J.
EcoN. THEORY 301 (1978) (explaining the economic principles underlying second-degree
price discrimination). Second-degree price discrimination can also take the form of quan-
tity discounts that induce consumers with a high willingness to pay to purchase more of the
product. See TitoLE, supra note 45, at 148-49.
52 Economists refer to the resale of products by consumers pa)ing the lower price to
those who would pay the higher price as "personal arbitrage." SeTIRotE, supra note 45, at
142-52.
53 Price discrimination between public and nonpublic firms only requires having mar-
ket power with respect to public firms. From the standpoint of nonpublic firms, incorpora-
tion in Delaware may well have close substitutes, and thus they may not be 1%illing to pay a
premium forit. Empirical evidence suggests that, if Delaware does enjoy some market vith
respect to nonpublic firms, that market power is rather slight. To be sure, Delaware is
known to be the state of choice for nonpublic firms that incorporate outside their home
state. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, Delaware's small market
share of nonpublic firms and the low rents it extracts from them suggest that its market
power with respect to these firms is insubstantial. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
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rating in Delaware, Delaware engages in third-degree price
discrimination. 54
A. Price Discrimination Through Franchise Taxes
In this subpart, we discuss Delaware's franchise tax. After show-
ing that Delaware's franchise tax structure is unique, we argue that it
results in higher charges to the firms that value incorporating in Dela-
ware the most. Delaware is the only state that imposes substantial
franchise taxes unrelated to the amount of business that firms con-
duct in the state. Other states either tax firms only to the extent that
they conduct business in the state (regardless of where they are
chartered) or impose only trivial charges on chartered firms. The
design of Delaware's franchise tax, its uniqueness, and its effect
strongly suggest that it is intended to effect third-degree price
discrimination. 55
54 Our account of Delaware's practice as constituting third-degree price discrimina-
tion is consistent with incorporation patterns in the United States. Because third-degree
price discrimination is inherently inaccurate, it may leave those consumers who are
charged more than they care to pay unserved, and may leave the served consumers who are
charged less than they are willing to pay with varying amounts of surplus. The fact that
about half of the public companies, but only a fraction of the nonpublic companies, incor-
porate in Delaware suggests that for most nonpublic firms, and for about half of public
firms, the benefits of a Delaware corporate charter do not justify the associated costs. See
supra text accompanying note 98. It also suggests that even with price discrimination, Dela-
ware leaves public firms with a greater surplus than nonpublic firms. Similar differences,
albeit on a smaller scale, seem to exist among public firms of different sizes. According to
one study, Delaware's share of New York Stock Exchange firms was 49.4% in 1981 and
62.2% in 1996. Daines, supra note 1, tbl.3. In those years, Delaware's share of Nasdaq
firms, which are typically smaller, was 34.7% and 52.0%, respectively. Id.
55 Conceptually, Delaware may also be viewed as engaging in second-degree price dis-
crimination which, in contrast to third-degree price discrimination, is premised on induc-
ing consumers to self-select rather than imposing different prices on them. See supra notes
49-51 and accompanying text. After all, firms choose by themselves whether to go public,
However, because the economic implications of going-public decisions seem to dwarf their
franchise tax implications, Kara Scannell, Year-End Review of Aarkets & Finance, WALL S-r. J.,
Jan. 2, 2001, at R6 (reporting a record $80.6 billion raised through 452 initial public offer-
ings in 2000), firms cannot realistically be expected to adjust their behavior in order to
reduce franchise-tax liability. Tailoring the costs of incorporation to these firm characteris-
tics is thus best analyzed as third-degree price discrimination. We view similarly Delaware's
price discrimination through litigation intensiveness. See infra note 153.
At first glance, it may appear that Delaware's franchise tax is not price discriminatory
because Delaware is in fact selling two distinct products: corporate law plus a little adjudi-
cation to nonpublic firms, and corporate law plus a lot more adjudication to public firms.
We believe that appearance to be misleading. What Delaware is selling is a bundle of legal
consequences that follow from incorporation. One such legal consequence is that Dela-
ware courts will exercise personal jurisdiction over the corporation and, with respect to
corporate matters, over corporate directors (which, in turn, increases the likelihood that a
suit involving the corporation will be brought in Delaware). These legal consequences--
and thus the product-are identical for all corporations. See infra Part II.B.2(c).
However, little turns on whether we use the term "price discrimination" or some other
label. What we describe and analyze is a set of legal and economic facts and relations: the
uniqueness of Delaware's franchise tax, its different incidence for public and nonpublic
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1. The Uniqueness of Delaware's Franchise Tax
Annual franchise taxes are the most significant charges states levy
on incorporated firms.56 Most states employ one of two methodolo-
gies to determine the amount of annual franchise taxes a corporation
must pay. First, twenty-four states and the District of Columbia charge
domestic firms (firms chartered in the state) either no franchise tax
or only a flat annual fee, ranging from $4.50 to $150, with a median
rate of $25. 57 The annual cost of incorporating in these states is thus
insubstantial. Second, Uventy states charge both domestic firms and
foreign firms a tax based on the portion of some measure of the com-
pany's value, such as assets or equity, that is attributed to business ac-
tivity conducted in-state.58 Since domestic and foreign corporations
corporations, the different values placed by these corporations on incorporating in Dela-
ware, the different costs to Delaware in servicing these corporations, the litigation.intensive
structure of Delaware corporate law, the incidence of that structure, its effect on incentives
to revise the law, the profits that Delaware derives from litigation, and the efficiency effects
of these dynamics. The accuracy of our factual description and the persuasiveness of our
analysis do not depend on whether Dela%%-are is selling the same product to public and
nonpublic firms (and firms value it differently because of their different likelihood of ben-
efiting from one of its attributes) or whether public and nonpublic firms buy different
products.
-56 STATE TAX GuIDE: ALL STATES ' 5-200 to 5951 (CCH ed., 2001) [hereinafter T,x
GUIDE]. States also charge companies initial incorporation fees and fees for specific ser-
vices. Id. 1-200 to 1-951. These fees, however, tend not to result in substantial revenues.
Forty-one states and the District of Columbia charge flat initial incorporation fees (ranging
from $35 to $300 and with a median fee of $72.50) and an initial filing fee pa)able by a
foreign corporation that is at least as high. Id. Twenty states (including eleven of the states
charging flat incorporation fees) and the District of Columbia charge incorporation fees
based on the number of authorized shares or the authorized amount of stated capital. Id.
In many of these states, even corporations with a large number of shares pay relativel)
small initial charges, although in some states the fee can be substantial. Id. For example,
Ohio (which assesses the highest fee) would charge a company with 100 million authorized
shares a one-time fee of $252,600. Id. 1-726. Even this fee is small, however, compared
to Delaware's $150,000 annual franchise tax payable by large public companies. Id. 5-
306.
In addition to these fees, which are payable by chartered firms, states also charge
corporate income taxes to firms conducting business in their jurisdiction. Corporate in-
come taxes are unrelated to our discussion because they are unaffected by Where the firm
is chartered. Telephone Interview ith Jeffrey Gotinger, State and Local Tax Partner,
Ernst & Young, New York (June 2000) [hereinafter Gotlinger Interview].
57 TA GuIDE, supra note 56, 5-200 to 5-951. Moreover, each of these states
charges its chartered companies an annual fee that is either the same as, or lower than, the
fee it charges to companies that conduct business in-state but are chartered elsewhere. Id.
Thus, for a company that conducts business in one of these states, there is no additional
cost to incorporating in that state. Appendix A presents a listing of the states charging
either no franchise taxes or only flat annual fees to domestic and foreign corporations.
58 Id. 5-200 to 5-951. For a listing of the states employing this methodology, their
tax base, and their apportionment method, see Appendix B. Thirteen of these states
charge their chartered firms a flat annual fee in addition to an apportioned fee.
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are taxed equally on the in-state portion of their tax base, corpora-
tions face no additional cost to incorporating in one of these states.59
The six remaining states-Delaware, Georgia, Nebraska, Rhode
Island, Virginia, and West Virginia-employ methodologies that could
theoretically result in higher annual fees to domestic corporations. 60
However, in each of these states, with the exception of Delaware, any
difference is likely to be modest. In four states, the annual franchise
tax is capped: Georgia's at $5000,61 Nebraska's at $11,995,62 Virginia's
at $850,63 and West Virginia's at $2500. 64 And Rhode Island's tax,
while uncapped, is very low. For example, a company with 100 million
authorized shares with a par value of $0.1 would pay an annual tax of
$2500.65
This leaves Delaware. Delaware corporations pay as franchise tax
the lower of two figures. 66 The first figure is based on the number of
59 For example, Arkansas charges an annual franchise tax of 0.27% on a corporation's
capital stock, multiplied by the ratio of the corporation's property in Arkansas to the cor-
poration's total property. TAx GuIDE, supra note 56, 5-246. Because Arkansas corpora-
tions and foreign corporations conducting business in Arkansas pay this 0.27% tax on the
portion of their capital stock allocated to Arkansas, their incorporation in Arkansas does
not affect the tax they pay.
60 Id. 5-305 to 5-310, 5-350 to 5-355, 5-605 to 5-606, 5-785 to 5-790, 5-890 to 5-895,
5-920 to 5-925. Georgia and Nebraska allocate the tax base only when determining the tax
payable by foreign companies. Id. 5-350 to 5-355, 5-605 to 5-606. Domestic corpora-
tions pay tax based on their net worth (Georgia), id. 5-351, or total capital (Nebraska),
although Nebraska charges a lower percentage tax rate to domestic companies than to
foreign ones, id. 5-606. West Virginia charges two types of annual taxes: the first allocates
the tax base between business activity conducted in-state and that conducted elsewhere,
and the state taxes domestic and foreign firms equally on the in-state portion of the tax
base, id. 5-921; the second, on stated capital, resembles the tax charged by Nebraska, id,
5-925. In the case of Nebraska and West Virginia, only companies that conduct relatively
little business in the state face an additional charge for incorporating in it. Companies that
conduct a lot of business in the state pay less if they are incorporated in it because the tax
rate for domestic companies is lower than the rate for foreign companies. Rhode Island
charges domestic and foreign companies a fee based on authorized capital. Id. 5-786.
Virginia charges domestic and foreign corporations an annual fee based on the number of
authorized shares. Id. 5-895. These fees represent additional costs to firms that are
chartered in Rhode Island or Virginia without conducting business in those states.
61 Id. 5-351.
62 Id. 5-606. The cap for foreign corporations is slightly higher-S15,000. Id,
63 Id. 5-895.
64 Id. 5-921. West Virginia's cap applies only to its tax on stated capital. Id.
65 Id. 5-786.
66 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 503(a) (1991). The structure of Delaware's franchise tax is
the product of four decades of experimentation. Initially, Delaware based its franchise tax
on the par value of issued and outstanding shares. 21 Del. Laws, ch. 166, § 4 (1899). In
1901, Delaware changed the tax base from "capital stock issued and outstanding" to "Capi.
tal actually paid in." 22 Del. Laws, ch. 16, § 2 (1901). In 1907, Delaware changed the tax
base to the amount of the authorized capital stock. 24 Del. Laws, ch. 47, § 1 (1907). In
1927, Delaware changed the tax base to the number of authorized shares. 35 Del. Laws,
ch. 5, § 4 (1927). Finally, in 1937, Delaware amended the law once again to bring it to its
current structure. 41 Del. Laws, ch. 5, § 1 (1937).
1220
PRICE DISCRIMINATION
authorized shares.67 For corporations with more than 10,000 author-
ized shares, the fee amounts to $90 for the first 10,000 shares plus S50
for each additional 10,000 shares, 8 The second figure is based on the
so-called "assumed par value capital" (APVC) of the firm.69 Ordina-
rily, the APVC is the product of the assets of the company and the
ratio of authorized to issued shares.70 For companies with an APVG
that exceeds $1 million, the fee is $200 for the first $1 million plus
$200 for each additional $1 million in APVC.7 The maximum fee is
$150,000 per year.7 2 Foreign companies pay a flat fee of $50 per
year.73
Delaware's method of assessing annual franchise taxes is thus
unique in two respects. First, Delaware is the only state where the
additional charge for incorporating is often substantial. Second, no
state but Delaware uses a system where the annual franchise tax is the
lower of two figures: one based on the number of authorized shares
and the other on APVC.
The fact that no state but Delaware structures its tax to gain sub-
stantial additional revenues from chartered firms casts doubt on the
claim that states actively compete for incorporations. The desire to
increase franchise-tax revenues is supposedly the main engine that
drives state competition.7 4 As presently structured, however, franchise
67 Diu.. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 503(a) (1) (1991).
68 Id. Firms with less than 3000 shares pay $30 annually, firms with between 8000 and
5000 authorized shares pay $50 annually, and firms with between 5000 and 10,000 author-
ized shares pay $90. Id. Delaware companies also pay a filing fee of $20. Id. § 391 (a) (17).
69 Id. § 503(a) (2).
70 If the firm has shares with a par value that is higher than the finn's gross assets
divided by the number of issued shares, the APVC of these shares is the number of author-
ized shares times their par value. Id. This scenario, however, is uncommon. Because the
par value of the shares has no economic significance, firms typically set it at a very low level,
if only to economize on franchise tax expenditures. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/
Enabling Balance in Corporate Law, 89 CoLu%. L RE%,. 1618, 1692 n.35 (1989). Similarly, the
calculation of APVC by companies with no par value shares is different from that described
in the text. DEt CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 503(a) (2) (1991). In practice, however, no-par capital
is rare.
71 Id.
72 Id. § 503(c).
73 Id. § 391(a) (8). While Delamare's franchise tax exceeds those of other states, its
corporate income-tax system is advantageous for companies whose only assets are in-
tangibles (such as securities, intellectual property, or debt). However, Delmare compa-
nies that pay higher franchise taxes than they would elsewhere are not motivated by the
desire to reduce their corporate income taxes. First, non-Dela-are companies can obtain
these advantages by holding all of their income-generating intangibles through a Delaware
subsidiary. Tax saving therefore cannot explain why so many publicly traded companies
choose Delaw-are as a state of incorporation for themselves rather than only for their sub-
sidiaries. Second, other states offer tax advantages that equal or surpass Delaw.are's. &e
Gotlinger Interview, supra note 56. Thus, even subsidiaries do not need to be incorporated
in Delaware to reduce taxes.
74 See eg., Bebchuk, supra note 1, at 1443; Cary, supra note 1, at 668-69; Minter, supra
note 1, at 255. But see MarkJ. Loewenstein, Ddaware as Demon: Tweonyfne 1ears After Ptofes-
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taxes provide only Delaware with a substantial incentive to attract
incorporations.
To be sure, there is still validity to the claim that a market for
incorporations exists. First, even in the absence of active competition,
the present system offers companies a choice of where to incorporate.
Second, states may still compete for incorporations in order to in-
crease their incorporation-related business.75 Moreover, while the
franchise taxes of states other than Delaware are currently not struc-
tured in a way that motivates states to attract incorporations, nothing
stops states from changing their franchise taxes so that, like Delaware,
they would gain higher tax revenues from increased incorporations
and, correspondingly, would have incentives to compete. Third, even
if no other state competes, Delaware is to some degree motivated to
make its corporate law attractive in order to charge a higher price for
incorporating in Delaware. 76 While we therefore acknowledge that a
market for incorporations exists, we challenge the assumption made
by first-generation state-competition scholars that this market is a
competitive one.77
sor Carys Polemi4 71 U. COLO. L. REv. 497, 501-02 (2000) (arguing that legislators devise
corporate law out of regard for public policy and not to attract incorporations). Roberta
Romano argues that her finding, that states that are more responsive to corporate con-
cerns earn a higher proportion of their revenues from franchise taxes, provides empirical
support for the claim that franchise-tax revenues motivate states to compete. See Romano,
supra note 1, at 236-40. Romano's franchise-tax variable depends on a state's total
franchise-tax revenues, not on the additional revenues that a state receives as a result of
incorporations. Id. at 238-39. As presently structured, however, it is unlikely that total
franchise-tax revenues are significantly correlated with additional revenues from
incorporations.
75 See Romano, supra note 1, at 241; infra Part II.B.2(b). The desire to increase incor-
poration-related business has generally only led to half-hearted attempts to compete with
Delaware. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. A notable exception is Nevada, which
actively competes for incorporation by certain holding companies. See, e.g., John Chavez,
Mesa Airline Move to Nevada Sparks Debate on Tax Burdens, ALBUQUERQUE J., Apr. 29, 1996,
Business Outlook at 2 (discussing corporate income-tax advantages to holding companies
that incorporate in Nevada). Even Nevada, however, has not made major attempts to
make itself attractive to publicly traded companies by forming a court of chancery similar
to Delaware's. Recently, Maine has been exploring the possibility of attracting Delaware
firms by offering law that is more shareholder friendly than Delaware's. See OFFcE oF
POLICY & LEGAL ANALYSIS, STATE OF ME., EXECurrvE SUMARv OF THE COMMISSION TO EN.
COURAGE INCORPORATIONS IN MAINE, 119th Leg., Ist Sess., at 4-6 (1999), available at http://
ww.state.me.us/legis/opla/corpor.PDF (last visited Apr. 14, 2001); see also Letter from
Richard H. Koppes, Co-Coordinator of the Stanford Institutional Investor Forum, to Sena-
tor Susan W. Longley and Representative Verdi L. Tripp, Co-Chairs of the Commission to
Encourage Incorporations in Maine (June 12, 2000) (on file with authors) (expressing
doubts of an institutional investors group about Maine's proposal in light of the inability of
shareholders to initiate reincorporations and the difficulty of duplicating Delaware's so-
phisticated judiciary).
76 See TIrooLE, supra note 45, at 100-02 (describing a monopolist's choice of product
quality).
77 The fact that each state has adopted a corporation law is consistent with our claim
that states do not actively compete for incorporations. States offer corporation laws, like
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2. Delaware's Franchise Tax and Price Discrimination
In this section, we argue that Delaware's peculiar tax schedule is
designed to price discriminate between corporations that assign a
high value and corporations that assign a low value to being incorpo-
rated in Delaware. We first analyze the incidence of Delaware's
franchise tax for different types of firms. We then demonstrate how
this incidence corresponds to the v.alue that firms place on incorporat-
ing in Delaware. Finally, we examine whether the differences in
franchise taxes payable by different finns are related to Delaware's
cost of serving these firms.
a. The Incidence of Delaware's Annual Franchise Tax
Delaware's franchise tax is the lower of two rates, the first derived
from the number of authorized shares, and the second from the com-
pany's APVC.78 As a result, a high tax is payable only by companies
that have both a large number of authorized shares and a high APVC.
These criteria assure, for one, that nonpublic companies have to
pay only minimal annual franchise taxes. Companies with 3000 or
fewer authorized shares pay the minimum fee of $30, regardless of
their APVC. 79 Virtually all nonpublic companies can achieve ,any de-
sired equity allocation among their owners with 3000 shares. Thus,
there is no business reason why they would have to pay more than the
minimum fee.80
Companies with publicly traded shares, by contrast, have a num-
ber of authorized shares, and an APVC that yields a substantially
higher franchise tax. Public companies need a large number of out-
standing shares to create a wide distribution of share ownership and
thus a liquid public market.8 1 A liquid public market, of course, is
one of the main benefits of being publicly traded.8 2 The necessary
number of outstanding shares is further increased by the fact that
other laws, as a service to residents (who, for example, save transaction costs by incorporat-
ing in their state of residence). The desire to provide a service for residents may also
account for the pattern of diffusion of corporate law innovations, which Roberta Romano
interprets as evidence of competition. See Romano, supra note 1, at 233-35.
78 DEL- CODE ANN. fit. 8, § 503(a) (1991); see supra notes 6673 and accompanying
text.
79 See DE.- CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 503(a) (1991).
80 Moreover, nonpublic companies do not need to have a substantial number of unis-
sued shares. When they need to issue additional shares, nonpublic companies can easily
obtain shareholder approval for a charter amendment increasing the number of author-
ized shares.
81 Thomas E. Copeland, Liquidi, Changes Following Sto] Splits, 34 J. Fix. 115, 115-16
(1979) (relating stock splits, which increase the number of shares outstanding, to liquidity
increases).
82 SeeYakovnAmihud & Haim Mendelson, Liquidi), Asset Pies and FThanrialPiYy, Fix.
A Avss-rsJ., Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 56, 56.
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shares are commonly traded in blocks of 100.83 Finally, public compa-
nies often have a substantial number of authorized but unissued
shares, which can be used to raise new capital, issue stock in stock
splits, issue stock to strategic investors in defense against hostile take-
overs, or fund acquisitions without having to obtain shareholder
approval.8 4
Public companies also have a high APVG. Recall that the APVC is
generally the product of the company's assets and the ratio of its au-
thorized to issued shares. For any company, then, the APVC is at least
as high as its assets.8 5 Public companies, of course, tend to have sub-
stantial assets. Moreover, as we noted above, public companies often
have a large number of unissued authorized shares, further increasing
their APVC.
To place the fees payable by public companies in perspective, we
used publicly available data on firms' capital stock and assets to calcu-
late the franchise tax payable by three random samples of public Dela-
ware companies whose stock is, respectively, listed on the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE companies), traded on the Nasdaq National
Market (Nasdaq-NM companies), or traded over the counter (OTC
companies). This method of data selection ensured that our sample
spans the spectrum of firm sizes for public companies, since NYSE
companies tend to be larger than Nasdaq-NM companies, and the lat-
ter tend to be larger than OTC companies. As Table 1 shows, the
annual franchise taxes payable by public companies are multiple or-
ders of magnitude above the minimum tax of $30. Indeed, most
NYSE companies pay the maximum franchise tax of $150,000 a year,
and few NYSE or Nasdaq-NM companies pay less than $10,000. Even
OTC companies pay on average over $20,000 in annual franchise
taxes.
83 N.Y. INST. OF FIN., How THE STOCK MARKET WoRms 27 John M. Dalton ed., 2d ed,
1993).
84 See, e.g., Coyote Network Sys., Inc., Proxy Statement 18 (une 29, 2000), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/57201/000095014800001363/defl4a.txt (last
visited Apr. 20, 2001) (stating that increasing the number of authorized shares will enable
the company to issue equity without the delay and expense of a special shareholder meet-
ing in connection with financings, acquisitions, other growth programs, stock splits, divi-
dends, and benefit plans). Stock exchange listing rules limit public companies to issuing
no more than 20% of their common stock or securities convertible into or exercisable to
common stock without shareholder approval. See NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTED
CoMPANY MIANUAL § 312.03 (1983); cf NATIONAL ASS'N OF SECURITIES DFLE.S, INC,, NASD
MANuAL § 4310(c) (25) (H) (i) (relating to Nasdaq SmalICap issuers); id. § 4460(i) (1) (re-
lating to Nasdaq National Market issuers) (1980).
85 See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 1: 1999 FRANCHISE TAX ESTrIMATES BY Firi TY&PE
Firm Type Sample Firms Paying Average Average Firms Paying
$150,000 Paid by Paid by All Less than
Others Finns $10,000
NYSE 50 40 (80%) $71,000 $134,000 0 (0%)
Nasdaq-NM 30 5 (17%) $51,000 $ 68,000 2 (7%)
OTC 30 0 (0%) $21,000 $ 21,000 19 (63%)
Most of Delaware's franchise-tax revenues, in turn, originate from
publicly traded companies. As of 1997, for example, we estimate that
between 10,000 and 12,000 United States companies had publicly
traded stock, of which 3000 were traded on the New York Stock Ex-
change, 4200 on the Nasdaq National Market, 800 on the Nasdaq
SmallCap market, 750 on the American Stock Exchange, and the re-
mainder on regional exchanges or over-the-counter.8 6 In fiscal year
1997, Delaware received $314 million in annual franchise-tax revenues
from 5050 firms paying $10,000 or more.8 7 To pay at least $10,000 in
annual franchise taxes, a company must have had at least 1.99 million
authorized shares and at least $50 million in APVC. Thus, virtually all
firms that paid such franchise taxes should have been publicly traded
corporations. By contrast, revenues from the 211,600 firms that paid
less than $10,000, most of which were nonpublic, were only $35
million.88
b. The Value Firns Place on Delaware Incorporation
The unusual incidence of Delaware's franchise tax-where public
companies pay a much higher tax than nonpublic companies and,
among the former, larger corporations pay a higher tax than smaller
ones-corresponds to the relative value that different firms place on
being incorporated in Delaware.
Consider first the distinction between public and nonpublic cor-
porations. All of the competitive advantages that Delaware enjoys
over other states are more meaningful to public companies. First,
public corporations are more likely than nonpublic ones to benefit
from Delaware's expert judiciary because they are more likely to be
86 In 1997, about 13,200 companies were required to file annual reports i he
Securities and Exchange Commission. Se OmCE OF PoucV RSEMRh, U.S. SF(,.& ExCU.
COMNI'N, D RaTORy OF COMPANIES REQIuiRED To FiLE A.N"m.u REPORT wrTni TuE SECtRi-
TIES AND EXCHANGE COMMsISSION (1997). This figure, however, includes some foreign com-
panies and companies that have publicly traded securities other than stock For data on
companies listed on the various markets, see Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., Mart:el Data,
at http://wv.marketdata.nasdaq.com/mr_outline.asp (last visited Mar. 19, 2001).




involved in corporate disputes.89 Many nonpublic corporations have
only a single shareholder. Such companies are rarely involved in cor-
porate disputes, which mostly concern conflicts among shareholders
or conflicts between dispersed shareholders and managers. And even
compared to nonpublic companies with more than one shareholder,
public companies are more likely to be involved in corporate disputes
because they have thousands of shareholders and the potential to be
subject to entrepreneurial class and derivative actions. 0
In fact, even though less than 2.5% of Delaware corporations are
public, most of Delaware's corporate litigation concerns public com-
panies. For example, of 78 chancery court opinions on corporate law
released in 1990, 65 involved public corporations, and only 13 in-
volved nonpublic ones.9 1 Put differently, the probability for a public
corporation to be involved in one of these cases was about 200 times
higher than the respective probability for a nonpublic corporation.
Second, public corporations are more likely than nonpublic ones
to benefit from Delaware's highly developed case law and from the
ease of obtaining legal advice. The legal problems facing public cor-
porations differ from those facing nonpublic corporations. For exam-
ple, the rules on hostile takeovers are significant only to public
corporations. 92 And even though both public and nonpublic corpora-
tions may face problems of self-dealing, the factual context of the self-
dealing and the availability of cleansing devices, such as approval by
disinterested directors, differ greatly.9 3 The product of many years of
litigation involving predominantly public corporations, Delaware case
law relates mostly to these firms and thus is more valuable to them.'
89 To the extent that some nonpublic companies are involved in corporate disputes,
they benefit from Delaware's expert judiciary even though they need to pay only minimal
franchise taxes. As we argue below, however, Delaware derives profits from such nonpublic
companies through its price discriminatory legal structure. See infra Part II.B.
90 Public companies are also more likely than nonpublic ones to benefit from Dela
ware's expert judiciary because they tend to be larger. The effect of firm size is discussed
infra text accompanying notes 99-105.
91 In the same year, all six Delaware Supreme Court opinions that related to corpo-
rate law involved public corporations. These figures were obtained from a review of all 105
opinions dated 1990 in the DE-CS Westlaw database that contain the search term
"Chancery." We excluded 21 documents because they were not related to corporate law or
were summary aflirmances. The database includes both reported and unreported
opinions.
92 See Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REv.
259, 280 (1967).
93 See id.
94 See, e.g., ROBERT C. CL.ARK, CORPORATE LAw 29, 164-66, 220- 21, 234-43 (1986) (ar-
guing that the law that suits public corporations does not suit nonpublic ones in the areas
of self-dealing, executive compensation, and corporate opportunities); Tara J. Wortman,
Note, Unlocking Lock-In: Limited Liability Companies and the Key to Underutilization of Close Cor-
poration Statutes, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1362, 1374-79 (1995) (arguing that rules well-suited for
public corporations, such as rules giving a high degree of deference to management, can
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Similarly, it is more important to public than to nonpublic corpora-
tions that most national law firms have specialized in Delaware law
because the law firms' expertise relates to disputes involving public
corporations.95
Third, only public corporations are likely to derive significant
benefits from the familiarity of investors and analysts with Delawrare
corporate law. This familiarity makes it easier for companies to sell,
and for investors to trade, shares governed by Delaware law.96 For
nonpublic companies, the shares of which are not traded, the finan-
cial community's familiarity with Delaware law is irrelevant.
Finally, Delaware's commitment to corporate needs is relevant
only to public firms. This commitment is important inasmuch as com-
panies incur costs in changing their state of incorporation. Commen-
tators disagree about the extent of these costs with respect to public
firms. 97 It is dear, however, that most nonpublic firms would incur
only trivial costs in changing their state of incorporation and thus
should place no value on Delaware's commitment.
Empirical evidence confirms that public companies value Dela-
ware law more than nonpublic companies. Delaware is the state of
incorporation for about 50% of the public companies in the United
States, but only for about 6% of the nonpublic companies.93 That
Delaware's market share among public companies substantially ex-
ceeds its share among nonpublic companies, even though Delaware
charges public companies a much higher franchise tax, suggests that
incorporation in Delaware is more valuable to public companies.
For similar reasons, among public corporations, the value of in-
corporation in Delaware increases with the size of the company.
Larger public companies benefit more than smaller public companies
have adverse effects on nonpublic corporations). &e generaly Ricam RDA. Pos.ER & K .
Nm-H E. Sco-rr, ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION Lw A%.ND SECURrIES REcLTLTION 111 (1980)
(describing specialization among state corporate laws); Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N.
Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in the Theon
, 
of the Rrm, 28J.L & EcoN. 179 (1985) (.ame).
Arguably, the expertise of Delaware's judiciary is also, to some extent, specific to disputes
involving public corporations.
95 See Skeel, supra note 25, at 161 (discussing the expertise of New York law firms in
takeover litigation).
96 See Kahan & Klausner, Economics of Boilerplate, supra note 9, at 719-29 (discussing
learning and network benefits related to fimiliarity with corporate contract terms);
Klausner, supra note 1, at 785-89 (discussing network benefits related to familiarity with
corporate contract terms).
97 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
98 See EcON. & STATiSTICS ADMIN., U.S. C&xsus BtRmE.Ay, STXF%'TtmcA AiisrRAar OF TIlE
UNrr=- STATEs: 2000, at 535 this. 854-55 (120th ed., 2000) (reporting United States incor-
porations data); Del. Div. of Corps., Ddaware Incorporating Statistics-1997, at http://
wwwvw.state.de.us/corp/graphs97.htrn (last visitedJuly 25, 2000) (reporting Dela-are incor-
poration data). Indeed, many companies change their state of incorporation to Delaware
shortly before they go public. See Romano, supra note 1, at 250, 252 tbl.4.
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from Delaware's developed law and expertjudiciary because they tend
to be more frequently involved in corporate legal disputes.99 Table 2
presents data on the frequency of corporate lawsuits from 1989 to
1998 for public companies participating in the Tillinghast-Towers Per-
rin Directors and Officers Liability Survey. 100 As Table 2 illustrates,
the frequency of corporate litigation for the largest public firms is
about 15 times higher than the frequency for the smallest public
firms. In a chi-square test, the differences in the average number of
lawsuits are significant at a 1% level. Moreover, the stakes of legal
disputes-and the corresponding benefits of litigating in Delaware-
are likely to be higher for larger corporations than for smaller ones.
TABLE 2: FREQUENCY OF CORPORATE LAWSUITS AMONG PuBLIc Finis
IN 1989-1998
Total Assets Number of Number of Percentage Total Number of
(in $1 millions) Firms Firms of Firms Number of Lawsuits
Involved in Involved in Lawsuits Per 1000
Litigation Litigation Firms
assets _ 100 236 4 1.7 4 .017
100 < assets _< 400 156 4 2.6 4 .026
400 < assets _< 1000 123 9 7.3 10 .081
1000 < assets 2000 118 18 15.3 21 .178
2000 < assets 235 34 14.5 57 .243
Source: Tillinghast-Towers Perrin
In addition, large public companies benefit from Delaware's rich
body of case law and readily available legal advice more than small
public companies because the size of transactions they undertake is
typically larger. 1 1 The large stakes involved in the operations of large
99 Arguably, the larger the public company, the greater the benefits from investors'
familiarity with Delaware law (because it has more investors) and from Delaware's commit-
ment (because obtaining shareholder approval for a reincorporation is more costly),
100 To focus on lawsuits arising under state corporate law, the data include only share-
holder lawsuits brought in federal or state court relating to: golden parachutes or execu-
tive compensation; a repurchase or a bid to repurchase securities; a breach of duty to
minority shareholders; general breach of fiduciary duty; shareholder suits, other than suits
brought exclusively in federal courts, relating to a takeover defense measure; a bid or a
threat by another company to take over the surveyed company; a bid or a threat by tie
surveyed company to take over another company; a merger or an acquisition; and a divesti-
ture or a spinoff. See TILuNGHnSr-TO ,Eas PERRIN, 1998 DIRECTORS AND OmrcERs L,1un'i-v
SURVEY: U.S. AND CANADLN REsuurs 8-9, 62-72 (1999) [hereinafter LrrTION StRVv].
We thank Mark Larsen of Tillinghast-Towers Perrin for providing us with the data in Table
2, which is not reported in that publication. For a summary of the 1999 Directors and Of-
ficers Liability Survey issued by Tillinghast-Towers Perrin in 2000, see 2 WILUAM F. KNEI'I'Eit
& DAN A. BAILEY, LiA-iLrn OF CORPORATE OmcEmS AND DmEcros § 27-1 to 27-10 (6th ed.
1998 & Supp. 2000).
101 According to Roberta Romano, the initiation or expansion of an acquisitions plan
is the most common reason why public companies reincorporate in Delaware. See
Romano, supra note 1, at 256.
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public companies also induce them to hire expensive national law
firms more often, and the value added from using that advice tends to
be higher for them.
Consistent with these arguments, empirical evidence shows that
large public corporations are more likely than small public corpora-
tions to incorporate in Delaware, even though large public corpora-
tions face higher annual franchise taxes.10 2 Once again, this suggests
that larger public companies value incorporating in Delaware more
highly than smaller ones.
Given all these benefits, a maximum tax of $150,000 for incorpo-
rating in Delaware may appear to be rather modest, especially for very
large companies, suggesting the possibility that Delaware is not charg-
ing the most it could. Part of the explanation for the restrained tax
policy is that, as we argue below, Delaware charges an additional price
in the form of litigation intensiveness.1 03 However, Delaware's
franchise-tax rates have not changed over the last ten years despite
substantial inflation over that period, and so rates probably could be
higher. Moreover, according to a study by Robert Daines, even after
considering all the costs involved, shareholders still value Delaware
firms by as much as 5% higher than comparable firms incorporated in
other states.'0 4 Arguably, Delaware could appropriate some of this
surplus, through higher taxes.
Another part of the explanation for Delaware's restraint may
therefore be that political considerations induce Delaware not to in-
crease its franchise-tax rates. For example, when we asked former and
present Delaware officials why franchise-tax rates are set at their cur-
rent levels, they explained that Delaware does not need more money,
that keeping taxes at modest levels increases Delaware's goodwill and
enables it to raise taxes when a need arises, that increasing franchise
taxes while reducing other taxes would be considered improper, and
that overdependence on corporate franchise taxes is not prudenLI°0
Perhaps the strongest pressure on Delaware not to raise taxes comes
from local interest groups, notably the corporate bar and corporate
service companies, which would not benefit directly from higher
franchise-tax revenues. Those interest groups could only be hurt by
102 Daines, supra note 1; supra Table 1.
103 See infra Part II.B.
104 See Daines, supra note 1, at 13. For the argument that this premium, v.hich can be
worth millions of dollars to large public firms, may well reflect the benefits we listed, see
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to Talxoer Law and Regilatory Compz-
tition, 87 VA. L REv. 111 (2001).
105 Interview with Secretary of the State of Delaware Edwardj. Freel, in Wilmington,
DeL (Dec. 11, 2000); Interview with Vice Chancellor Leo E. Strine, Jr., Dclauare Court of
Chancery, in Wilmington, Del. (Dec. 11, 2000) [hereinafter Strine Interview].
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any tax increase because it could drive some of their clients away from
Delaware.
c. Why Cost Differences Do Not Account for Price Differences
Charging different franchise taxes to different companies, even if
the taxes are related to the value that these companies derive from
incorporating in Delaware, would nevertheless not constitute price
discrimination if the tax differences were based on differences in the
costs that Delaware incurs in providing services to these firms. 10 Evi-
dence strongly suggests, however, that cost differences do not explain
the tax differences, at least with respect to the tax differences between
public and nonpublic companies.
For example, the franchise tax payable in Delaware by a large
public firm can be as high as 5000 times the tax payable by a typical
nonpublic firm: $150,000 versus $30 per year. 10 7 Although it costs
Delaware more to serve large public firms than nonpublic firms, the
ratio of these costs is nowhere near 5000 to 1.
Delaware's costs are mostly associated with the provision of ad-
ministrative services by the Division of Corporations and the provision
ofjudicial services by the chancery court. 108 The total costs budgeted
by Delaware for these items were $10.1 million in fiscal year 2000.1011
The relative costs of serving public and nonpublic firms depend on
whether public firms use these services more frequently than nonpub-
lic ones and whether it is more costly, per use, to serve public firms
than nonpublic ones.
Consider first the provision of administrative services, such as the
filing of charter amendments or merger certificates. Arguably, large
public companies use these services somewhat more frequently than
private ones. On a per-use basis, however, according to administrators
in the Delaware Division of Corporations, the paperwork is similar for
all corporations."10 Thus, even though it is plausible that the overall
costs of providing administrative services to a large public firm are
higher than the costs of providing these services to a nonpublic firm,
106 Price discrimination is defined as the sale of products at prices that are in different
ratios to marginal costs. See supra Part I.B.2.
107 See supra notes 66-80 and accompanying text.
108 See Romano, supra note 1, at 240. The costs of legislation are probably small and, in
any case, would not constitute marginal costs.
109 The amounts budgeted for the Division of Corporations and the chancery court in
fiscal year 2000 were, respectively, $8.1 million and $2 million. Office of the Budget, State
of Del., FY2001 Governor's Recommended Budget, at http://www.state.de.us/budget/fy2001/
vol2-2001.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2001).
110 See Interview with Laura Y. Marvel, Corporation Administrator, Delaware Division
of Corporations, in Wilmington, Del. (Dec. 11, 2000); Interview with Eileen H. Simpson,




it is highly implausible that the ratio of these costs is anywhere near
5000 to 1.
Turning to the provision of judicial services, our survey indicates
that a public firm is about 200 times more likely to be involved in a
corporate lawsuit than a nonpublic firm."' On a per-lawsuit basis,
however, two members of the Delaware judiciary report that a typical
dispute involving a public firm consumes the same amount ofjudicial
time as a dispute involving a nonpublic firm.112 Thus, the overall cost
difference between large public firms and nonpublic firms that is re-
lated to judicial services is several orders of magnitude below the tax
difference. Even if these estimates of the differences in the cost of
providing administrative services as well as in the frequency and dura-
tion of lawsuits between large public and nonpublic Delaware firms
are overly conservative, they are far too low to account for the
franchise-tax difference.
That Delaware's franchise-tax differences do not reflect adminis-
trative and judicial cost differences is consistent with the pricing struc-
ture employed by other states. Most states charge the same marginal
incorporation tax to public and nonpublic firms.113 Moreover, while
Delaware charges by far the highest franchise tax to public firms, the
tax it levies on nonpublic firms is comparatively low. These pricing
regimes make it implausible that Delaware's cost of serving large pub-
lic firms is 5000 times as high as its cost of serving nonpublic firms,
and that Delaware extracts the same percentage premium from both
public and nonpublic firms.
While we can conclude that the difference in franchise taxes pay-
able by public and nonpublic firms cannot be attributed to cost differ-
ences, we are less confident about the difference in taxes payable by
larger and smaller public firms. For one, the difference in taxes paya-
ble by large and small public firms is only about fifteen to one.114 And
while there is no reason to believe that large and small public firms
make different use of administrative services, the Tillinghast-Towers
Perrin survey indicates a difference in the frequency of lawsuits for the
largest and smallest public companies in the same order of magni-
I1I See supra note 91 and accompanying text. This figure averages large and small pub-
lic firms. About one out of four public firms incorporated in Delaw-re pay- the maximum
franchise tax of $150,000. See supra text accompanying notes 87-88 and infra Table 3.
Thus, even if all corporate litigation by public firms involved firms pa)ing the maximum
franchise tax, such firms would be about 800 times more likely to be involved in lawsuits
than nonpublic firms-far less than the 5000 to 1 ratio in franchise taxes.
112 Interview with Vice ChancellorJack B.Jacobs, Delaware Court of Chancery, in Vd-
mington, Del. (Dec. 11, 2000); Strine Interview, supra note 105. Thejudges attributed this
fact to inadequate corporate legal planning or acrimonious personal relations in lawsuits
involving nonpublic firms. Id.




tude. 115 Given the roughness of the available data, the evidence is
thus insufficient to determine whether the difference in taxes payable
by large and small public firms reflects cost differences or constitutes
price discrimination.
B. Price Discrimination Through Litigation-Intensive Law
In this subpart, we argue that the litigation-intensive structure of
Delaware law results in third-degree price discrimination. We first ex-
amine several features of Delaware's corporate law that cause it to be
litigation intensive. We then argue that the costs of such law fall pri-
marily on firms that derive the highest net benefit from incorporating
in Delaware.
In contrast to franchise-tax price discrimination-which we re-
gard as intentional-we view price discrimination through litigation-
intensive corporate law as incidental. That is, we do not claim that
anyone, least of all members of Delaware's judiciary,' 16 has made Del-
aware corporate law litigation intensive for the purpose of raising Del-
aware's profits. But even if unintended, the price-discriminatory
effect of this law impairs Delaware's incentives to reduce excessive liti-
gation intensiveness. If the costs of litigation intensiveness did not fall
primarily on companies that derive high net benefits from incorporat-
ing in Delaware, and therefore had a stronger adverse effect on Dela-
ware's incorporation business, Delaware would have stronger
incentives to make its law less litigation intensive, whether by a legisla-
tive override or by the appointment of judges that follow a different
judicial approach. 117
115 SeesupraTable2.
116 For factors that may motivate judges in general and Delaware judges in particular,
see RiCHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAw 109-44 (1995); Frank H. Easterbrook, Whats So
SpecialAboutJudges, 61 U. CoLo. L. REv. 773, 775-78 (1990); Kamar, supra note 10, at 1940-
43; Richard A. Posner, Wat Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same ThingEverybody Else
Does), 3 Sup. CT. EcoN. Rv. 1 (1993). Moreover, arguments by legal counsel for parties to
corporate disputes, whose benefit from litigation is evident, may influence court decisions.
117 See WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: GASES AND MATERIALS ON
AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND CORPORATIONS 336-37 (4th ed. 2000) (noting that the anxiety
among directors and officers caused by the landmark decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), motivated the Delaware legislature to enact a statute that permits
firms to opt out of monetary liability for breaches of the duty of care, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 102(b)(7) (1991)). While it may be hard to predict whether a judicial candidate will
turn out to write litigation-intensive opinions, once appointed to the bench it is possible
not to reappoint ajudge who writes such opinions at the end of his or her twelve-year term.
For an example of a failure to reappoint a Delaware Supreme CourtJustice due to opposi-
tion from the corporate bar, see Richard B. Schmitt, Reappointment Seems Unlihelyfor Moore,
WALL ST.J., May 18, 1994, at B7. Similarly, to the extent a litigation-intensive system results
in benefits to Delaware's corporate bar, the corporate bar will be inclined not to endorse
proposals to make Delaware law less litigation-intensive even if doing so would benefit
Delaware corporations. Cf Demetrios G. Kaouris, Note, Is Delaware Still a Haven for Incorpo-
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1. Delaware Law and the Level of Litigation
In this section, we discuss four qualities that make Delaware's cor-
porate law litigation intensive. First, Delaware law is based on stan-
dards requiring judicial application after the fact. Second, the
standards it employs are fact intensive. Third, Delaware law contains
substantial ambiguities concerning which legal test applies. Finally, its
judicial precedents are narrow.118
It is helpful to clarify at the outset several aspects of our claim.
First, the discussion that follows is not meant as proof that Delaware
law in its entirety, or even the aspects of it we discuss, are in fact exces-
sively litigation intensive. We know of no way of providing such a
proof. 1 9 Rather, we provide examples of what appears to us and to
many others as a high degree of litigation intensiveness.1 2 0 These im-
ration?, 20 DELJ. Cons. L 965, 971-72 (1995) (noting that the Delay, are Bar Association's
Section on General Corporation Law has substantial responsibility for revising the statute).
118 Delaware complements these substantive qualities with a liberal approach toward
directors' and officers' liability insurance and indemnification, negligible court fees, ab-
sence of a requirement for plaintiffs to post security for expenses, extraterritorial reach,
and generous fee awards to plaintifls' attorneys. All of these features further encourge
litigation. See Cary, supra note 1, at 686-87; Macey & Miller, supra note 8, at 496-97.
119 Determination of the optimal use of standards, the optimal degree of fact specific-
ity, the optimal extent of ambiguity, and the optimal scope of precedents would be taunt-
ingly complex. It would involve consideration of many factors, including the cost of
creating and applying different legal rules and standards, the frequency wit which differ-
ent types of disputes occur, the social value of certainty in legal outcomes, the cost of
obtaining legal advice, the effect of imperfect legal tests on primary behavior, and the
significance of learning through experience. Cf. Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of
Administrative Rules, 93 YAUE LJ. 65, 67-68 (1983); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEG-aL STv. 257 (1974); Ehud Kamar, Shareholder
Litigation Under Indeterminate Corporate Lau,, 66 U. Cm. L Rev. 887 (1999) (discussing the
costs of indeterminacy in corporate law and the costs of reducing indeterminacy through
the production of precedents); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis,
42 Dune UJ. 557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Lao Adjudication,
89 H v. L REv. 1685, 1687-1701 (1976); Klausner, supra note 1, at 777 (discussing the
costs of indeterminacy in corporate law).
120 Commentators are in wide agreement that Delaware corporate law lacks clarity.
See, eg., Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 1, at 1190 ("pro-uncertainty tilt"); Victor Brudney,
Revisiting the Import of Shareholder Consent for Corporate Fidudary Loyaly Obligations 25J. Co ni.
L 209, 235 (2000); John C. Coates IV, 'Fair Value" as an Avoidable Rule in Corporate Law
Minoriy Discounts in Conflicts Transactions, 107 U. PA. L REV. 1251, 1287 (1999) (Labeling
Delaware law on minority discounts in appraisal proceedings as "a mess"); RonaldJ. Gilson,
Unocal Fifteen Years Later (And 1Wzat We Can Do About It), 26 D±.- J. Cons. L 491 (2001)
(arguing that Delaware's takeoverjurisprudence is ambiguous); RonaldJ. Gilson & Reinier
Kraakman, What Triggers Revlon P, 25 WAKE FoREsr L Rev. 37, 56 (1990) (arguing that the
scope of the duty to sell the firm at the highest possible price is insufficiently defined);
Ediard B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Ddaware Corporate Law 1l al?, 44 UCLAL L
REv. 1009, 1015 (1997) (claiming that Delamare corporate law is made up of "fact-inten-
sive, normatively saturated descriptions" of conduct and 'of process-descriptions that are
not reducible to rules"); Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Path-Dependent Competi-
tion for Corporate Charters: Manager Choice, Shareholder Veto 7 (Apr. 1999) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with authors) (describing Delaware law as "vague" and "litigation
intensive"). But seeJill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Ddaware Courts in the Competition for
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pressions are consistent with our claim that the price-discriminatory
effect of litigation intensiveness provides incentives to Delaware to of-
fer law that is excessively litigation intensive.' 2 ' But because other
Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1063-64 (2000) (arguing that the heavy reliance
of Delaware corporate law on courts is a virtue).
Practitioners, some of whom writing either before or after serving on the bench, seem
to agree. See, e.g., William T. Allen, Ambiguity in Corporation Law, 22 DEL. J. COR,. L. 894,
903 (1997) (noting that the practice of contextualism suffuses Delaware's corporate juris-
prudence); Stephen Fraidin & Jon D. Hanson, Toward Unlocking Lockups, 103 YALE L.
1739, 1749-52 (1994) (criticizing Delaware's legal standard for evaluating lockup options as
lacking content); Leo Herzl et al., Sales and Acquisitions ofDivisions, 5J. CORP. L. 3, 25-26
(1982) (noting uncertainty regarding the meaning of "sale of substantially all assets" for
purposes of shareholder vote);John F. Olson & Patricia M. Hynes, Defensive Techniques and
Avoiding Problems, in 23RD ANNUAL INSTrtE ON SECURiTIES REGULATION 357, 360 (Harvey
L. Pitt et al. eds., 1992) (suggesting that corporate counsel trust their instincts when advis-
ing clients about the legitimacy of antitakeover defenses); E. Norman Veasey, The New In-
carnation of the Business Judgment Rule in Takeover Defenses, 11 DEL. J. CoRP. L, 503, 512
(1986) (reducing Delaware law to a "smell test"); Pat Vlahakis, Fiduciary Duties and Fiduciay
Outs: Is There a New Delaware Standard?, 2 M&AJ. 13 (2000) (arguing that recent Delaware
takeover cases create uncertainty); Back to the Future: A Reunion wit Tulane's Class of '94, 2
M&AJ. 1, 3 (2001). The following exchange was reported between former Delaware Su-
preme CourtJustice Andrew Moore and renowned corporate law practitioner Martin Lip.
ton at the Seventh Annual Corporate Institute sponsored by Tulane Law School in 1994:
Mr. Lipton: Obviously, the single most significant question with respect to
mergers and acquisitions today is, "What did they mean in Paramount?"
Justice Moore: When you say much is to be learned from Paramount, it's as
if no one ever had a hint of what the rules of the game were before Para-
mount. After [the Delaware Supreme Court decisions in] Unocal, Revlon,
MacMillan, and certainly Smith versus Van Gorkom, one would have
thought that the rules were well known.
Mr. Lipton: Obviously not.
Id. at 3.
Indeed, even Delaware judges speaking from the bench acknowledge the uncertainty
in Delaware corporate law. See, e.g., Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 901-02
(Del. Ch. 1999) (noting that the waste doctrine engenders excessive and wasteful litigation
and urging its reexamination); In re Gaylord Container Corp. Shareholder Litig., 747 A.2d
71, 77 (Del. Ch. 1999) (noting "doctrinal inconsistencies" in, and lack of rationale for,
distinction between derivative and direct claims alleging breach of fiduciary duties in cor-
porate control cases); Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098, 1113-15 (Del. Ch. 1999),
affd, 746 A.2d 277 (Del. 2000) (noting that Delaware law concerning the effect of share-
holder ratification in the face of an alleged breach "is not a model of clarity," that it con-
tains "confusing distinctions," and that "the legal effect of shareholder ratification, as it
relates to alleged breaches of the duty of loyalty, may be one of the most tortured areas of
Delaware law"); Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1287-88 (Del.
1989) (noting that the proportionality test for antitakeover defensive measures may have
caused confusion).
Admittedly, the Delaware General Corporation Law regulates some aspects of corpo-
rate law with a fair amount of clarity. For example, it contains precise rules on how to
perfect appraisal rights. SeeDEL- CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1991). However, even where the
code contains relatively precise language, Delaware courts do not necessarily follow the
code when they find the results objectionable. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d
701 (Del. 1983) (adopting a non-literal interpretation of § 262(h)); Speiser v. Baker, 525
A.2d 1001 (Del. Ch. 1987) (adopting a non-literal interpretation of § 160(c)).
121 See infra Part II.B.2.
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forces also shape Delaware law, one cannot be certain that the degree
of litigation intensiveness is determined by these incentives.
Similarly, we do not argue that Delaware law is litigation intensive
to a degree that it provides no guidance at all. If that were the case,
Delaware law would have no special appeal to corporations: its wealth
of precedents would be as good as none and the widespread use of its
law would not lead to familiarity. But that is not the case. Although
individual Delaware decisions are often not a model of clarity, taken
as a whole they do clarify the law. And since Delaware offers by far the
largest body of corporate law precedents, its law is more predictable
than those of other states. 122
The relevant comparison, however, is not between Delaure law
and the laws of other states.123 We can infer very little from the
choices made by other states because they do not appear to compete
vigorously for incorporations. 124 Instead, they seem to try to econo-
mize on lawmaking costs by following the Model Business Corporation
Act and, occasionally, Delaware legal precedents.'2 Even for a state
intent on competing with Delaware, losing the benefits associated with
offering law bearing some resemblance to Delaware law may well
prove counter-productive.' 26 Such a state may also be reluctant to in-
vest in formulating clearer alternatives to Delaware law because by do-
ing so it would lose the advantages of at least partial compatibility with
122 See, e-g., Romano, supra note 1, at 277; Roberta Romano, Te State Cornpetition Dhate
in Corporate Law, 8 CARDozo L Rv. 709, 725 (1987); see also Klausner, supra note 1, at 842-
47 (arguing that interpretative network externalities increase the value of Delamare law).
123 The uniqueness of Delaware's franchise tax is different. We mentioned it not only
as an indication of Delaware's intention to price discriminate (indeed, Delar,,are's
franchise tax would be discriminatory regardless of other states' actions), but mainly to
refute the widespread belief that states compete to increase their franchise-tax revenues.
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
124 See, eg., supra note 35 and accompanying text. Similarly, we can infer little from
Congress's decision to exempt disclosure claims arising under traditional corporate law
(the so-called Delaware carve-out, though the exemption applies to the law of any state)
from the scope of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, Pub. L No. 105-353,
112 Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). For one, Congress
designed the Uniform Standards Act to preempt suits under state securities laws (princi-
pally California's) that resemble typical 10b-5 suits where secondary-market purchasers
claim that they have been misled by fhlse statements into buying shares at an inflated price.
David M. Levine & Adam C. Pritchard, 77w Securities Litigation Unifon Standards Act of 199S:
The Sun Sets on California's Blue Sky Laws, 54 Bus. Lw. 1 (1998). Such claims cannot even
be asserted under Delaware law. Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 13 (Del. 1998). Moreover,
our argument that Delaware law may wel be excessively litigation intensive does not imply
that federal law should preempt it.
125 See illiam J. Carney, Te Production of Corporate Lau% 71 S. Cu. L RE%,. 715, 725,
734 (1998). The most important area where state corporate laws do significantly differ is
antitakeover protection. See id. at 735-36. Legislation in that area, however, has historically
responded to requests by "broad coalitions of interest groups," rather than to the desire to
attract incorporations. See Roberta Romano, The PoliticalEconomy ofTaleoter Statuttes 73 V,.
L REV. 111, 120-22 (1987).
126 See Kamar, supra note 10, at 1937-39.
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Delaware law and because a successful formulation could readily be
emulated by others. 127 The only relevant comparison is thus between
actual Delaware law and Delaware's potential, given its substantial
body of precedents. On this front, predictability is wanting.1 28
a. Use of Fact-Intensive and Standard-Based Tests
Delaware's corporate law tends to rely on fact-intensive, standard-
based tests. By fact-intensive, we mean that a wide array of factual
circumstances is relevant to the resolution of a legal dispute. By stan-
dard-based, we mean that the relation between a certain set of facts
and the outcome of a legal dispute is determined ex post rather than
ex ante. 129
To illustrate these aspects of Delaware law, consider the entire
fairness test.'30 The entire fairness test is one of the most important
elements of fiduciary duty law, and applies, at least initially, to all self-
dealing transactions.1 3 1 Here is the classic statement of the test:
The concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair
price. The former embraces questions of when the transaction was
timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the
directors, and how the approvals of the directors and the stockhold-
ers were obtained. The latter aspect of fairness relates to the eco-
nomic and financial considerations of the proposed merger,
including all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future
prospects, and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inher-
ent value of a company's stock. However, the test for fairness is not
a bifurcated one as between fair dealing and price. All aspects of
the issue must be examined as a whole since the question is one of
entire fairness.' 3 2
The entire fairness test thus involves a multi-factor, multi-dimensional
balancing test. What constitutes fair price depends on multiple fac-
127 See id.; see also Ian Ayres, Suppl)ySide Inefficiencies in Corporate Charter Competition: Les.
sons from Patents, Yachting and Bluebooks, 43 U. KAN. L. Rv. 541, 545-50 (1995) (observing
that the absence of patent protection deters corporate law innovations); RonaldJ. Daniels,
Swuld Provinces Compete? The Casefor a Competitive Corporate Law Market, 36 McGILL Lj. 130,
182 (1991) (suggesting that governments have an incentive to agree not to innovate in the
area of corporate law). Rational herding may also explain other states' adoption of Dela-
ware's indeterminate law. Kamar, supra note 10, at 1938. For general discussion of herd
behavior in corporate law, see Kahan & Klausner, Path Dependence, supra note 9, at 353-58.
128 Kamar, supra note 10, at 1914.
129 Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 119, at 258; Kaplow, supra note 119, at 559-60;
Kennedy, supra note 119, at 1687-88.
130 For additional examples of fact-intensive standards in Delaware law, see Kamar,
supra note 10, at 1915-17.
131 See Robert A. Ragazzo, Toward a Delaware Common Law of Closely Held Corporations, 77
WASH. U. L.Q. 1099, 1136 (1999). The entire fairness test also applies where the plaintiff
proves that the directors breached their duty of care. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor,
Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1164 (Del. 1995).
132 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (citations omitted).
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tors. What constitutes fair dealing depends on multiple factors. And
the relationship between fair price and fair dealing-"not a bifurcated
one," but rather "examined as a whole"-approaches the
transcendental. 33
To be sure, corporate fiduciaries can avoid an entire fairness re-
view by having disinterested directors or shareholders approve the
transaction. Alas, the law pertaining to such approvals is no less fact
intensive and standard based than the entire fairness test itself.134
b. Ambiguity About the Applicable Legal Test
A related feature of Delaware corporate law is its tendency to be
ambiguous about which legal test applies to a certain set of facts. A
well-known instance of such ambiguity involved an important issue in
hostile takeovers: does a change of control alter the test according to
which defensive tactics are judged from the less exacting Unocal test' 3 5
to the more exacting Revlon test?' 36 In 1989, when Paramount Com-
munications tried to acquire Time, the Delaware Supreme Court re-
jected Paramount's argument that Revlon applied:
133 For an alternative approach based on requiring disinterested shareholder vote, see
for example Ont. Sec. Comm'n, Rule 61-501: Insider Bids, Issuer Bids, Going Private Trans-
actions and Related Party Transactions, 23 O.S.C.B. 965 (2000), available at hnp://
wwv.osc.govon.ca/en/Regulation/Rulemaling/Rules/61-50Ifr_20000414.htnl (last vis-
ited Mar. 20, 2001); United Kingdom Listing Authority Listing Rules § 11.4 (May 2000).
134 Shareholder approval is effective only when shareholders are uncoerced and fully
informed, See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 889 (Del. 1985); MMIaug'ir, 457 A2d at
707. Similarly, director approval is effective only when the directors are truly independent
and disinterested, and effectively negotiate the transaction. Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694
A.2d 422, 428-29 (Del. 1997); Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., 638 A.2d 1110, 1120-21
(Del. 1994); Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099, 1106 (Del. 1985). In all
three cases, the application of this test led the trial court and the appellate court to oppo-
site conclusions. Moreover, in controlling shareholder transactions, even effective ap-
proval by disinterested directors or shareholders only shifts the burden of proof to the
plaintiff to prove that the transaction wras not entirely fair. Lynch Communication Sys., 638
A.2d at 1117.
135 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Corp., 493 A.2d 946, 958 (Del. 1985).
136 See MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1250 (Del.
Ch. 1985). For other examples of ambiguity, compare Loudon t,. Ardier.Oanieds.,lidland Co.,
700 A.2d 135, 142 (Del. 1997) (holding that there is no per se rule of damages for breach
of the duty of disclosure), with In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., Litig., 634 A.2d 319, 333 (Del.
1993) (holding that there is a per se rule of damages for breach of the duty of disclosure);
and compare Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 715 (holding that appraisal remedy shall govern the
financial remedy available to minority shareholders in a cash-out merger), with Rad!:in, 498
A-2d at 1107-08 (holding that appraisal is not an exclusive remedy when the defendant
engaged in faithless acts that were reasonably related to and have a substantial impact
upon the price offered in freeze-out merger). For discussion by commentators of ambigu-
ity in Delaware law, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Ma,*cts, and Court.% 91 CoLum. L
REv. 1931, 1934-48 (1991); MarkJ. Roe, Tak!overPolitits, in THE Du. DEcADF WHAT Tum-
ovERs AND LEVERAGED Butous MEAN FOR Co~'RP.TE Goww'sucE 321, 340-42 (Margaret
M. Blair ed., 1993); Skeel, supra note 25, at 152 & n.75.
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[T]he Chancellor found the original Time-Warner merger agree-
ment not to constitute a "change of control" and concluded that the
transaction did not trigger Revlon duties. The Chancellor's conclu-
sion is premised on a finding that "[b]efore the merger agreement
was signed, control of the corporation existed in a fluid aggregation
of unaffiliated shareholders representing a voting majority-in
other words, in the market." The Chancellor's findings of fact are
supported by the record and his conclusion is correct as a matter of
law. However, we premise our rejection of plaintiffs' Revlon claim
on different grounds, namely, the absence of any substantial evi-
dence to conclude that Time's board, in negotiating with Warner,
made the dissolution or break-up of the corporate entity inevitable,
as was the case in Revlon.
Under Delaware law there are, generally speaking and without
excluding other possibilities, two circumstances which may impli-
cate Revlon duties. The first, and clearer one, is when a corporation
initiates an active bidding process seeking to sell itself or to effect a
business reorganization involving a clear break-up of the company.
However, Revlon duties may also be triggered where, in response to
a bidder's offer, a target abandons its long-term strategy and seeks
an alternative transaction involving the breakup of the company. 1 37
As irony has it, five years later Paramount was the target of a hos-
tile bid by QVC Network.'3 8 Even though Paramount had clearly em-
barked on a change of control before QVC made its bid, Paramount
argued, citing Time, that it was not subject to Revlon duties. The Dela-
ware Supreme Court disagreed. After quoting the above passage from
Time, the court explained:
The Paramount defendants have misread the holding of Time-
Warner. Contrary to their argument, our decision in Time-Warnerex-
pressly states that the two general scenarios discussed in the above-
quoted paragraph are not the only instances where "Revlon duties"
may be implicated. The Paramount defendants' argument totally
ignores the phrase "without excluding other possibilities." 13 9
A change of control, the court held, does trigger Revlon.' 40
137 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1990)
(second alteration in original) (citation omitted).
138 See Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 38-40 (Del,
1994).
139 Id. at 47 (typeface altered).
140 Id. at 45. More recent decisions of the Court of Chancery appear to further muddy
the water by stating that even absent a change of control the board must retain the free-
dom to negotiate with third parties. See ACE Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95, 105
(Del. Ch. 1999) (asserting that the board must retain this freedom); Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., Civil Action No. 17398, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 202, at *4 (Del.
Ch. Sept. 27, 1999) (similarly holding that the board must retain the freedom to negotiate
with third parties). But see IXC Communications, Inc. S'holders Litig., CA. No, 17324,
1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 210, at *16-*17 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 1999) (holding that the board need
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c. Narrow Breadth of Precedents
The fact-intensive, standard-based approach of Delaware corpo-
rate law necessarily limits the breadth of Delaw,-are precedents. Dela-
ware precedents, however, are narrow for another reason as well.
Delaware judges intend their decisions to be interpreted narrowly.
Delaware opinions thus frequently include admonitions that they are
dependent on a particular set of facts and regularly shy away from
announcing general rules that do not leave any escape hatch. Con-
sider the following quotations, all taken from textbook cases:
[W]e do not intend any limitation on the historic powers of tie
Chancellor to grant such other relief as the facts of a particular case
may dictate.141
It is the nature of the judicial process that we decide only the case
before us-a case which, on its facts, is clearly controlled by estab-
lished Delaware law... In other cases [the result] may be less
clear.142
In my view, our inability to foresee now all of the future settings ...
counsels against the adoption of a per se rule. 143
Judges presumably make occasional statements of this sort not only in
Delaware, and not only in corporate cases. In Delamare corporate
cases, however, these statements seem to be very common indeed, and
appear to reflect an exceptionally particularized approach to judicial
lawmaking.
The limited predictive value of Delaware corporate law prece-
dents is striking in light of the fact that these precedents-unlike, say,
federal court precedents on issues of securities regulation-are pro-
duced in a state that takes pride in offering predictability. Indeed,
one would expect a law that has been shaped by competition not only
to be at least as predictable as laws that are not the product of compe-
tition, but to be markedly better on that front.4'4 Delaware law, in our
assessment, is not.
d. "The Essence of Delaware Law"
Maybe the best evidence that the examples we presented are not
isolated anomalies, but rather characteristic of Delaare law, is the
not retain this freedom). For criticism leveled at these cases by practitioners for breaking
with precedents, see Vlahakis, supra note 120.
141 Weinberger; 457 A.2d at 714.
142 QVQ, 637 A.2d at 51.
143 Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 662 (Del. Ch. 1988).
144 It is therefore inapposite to our thesis that some also .iew as indeterminate legal
areas such as tort and products liability law, antitrust law, constitutional law, or health law.
See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Ddawvares Corporate Law System: Is Corporate Amerka Btuing an Exquisite
Jewd or a Diamond in the Rough: A Response to Kahan & Kamar's Price Discrimination in the
Market for Corporate Law, 86 COPnNE.LL L REv. 1257, 1274-75 (2001) (noting these view).
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following anecdote, told to us by William Allen, the former
Chancellor of Delaware and now a professor in the law and business
schools at New York University:
After I had been serving as Chancellor for about three years, I had
lunch with Samuel Arsht. Arsht, who by that time was retired from
active practice of law, was regarded in his time as the leading Dela-
ware expert on corporation law. We discussed corporation law
(which was always the subject of our chats) and particularly the
need to find the most elemental aspects of the law. Arsht, who had
served as revisor of the Delaware Code in 1953, suggested seriously
(as he reported, at any rate) that the Delaware corporation law be
rewritten to have a single provision: "A corporation may do any act
that a natural person is privileged to do and corporate directors are
free from liability to the corporation whenever they authorize the
corporation to do any lawful act, so long as they exercise a good
faith business judgment that the act is in the best interests of the
corporation." It was Sam's view that such a provision would not con-
stitute a change in the Delaware law and would give the essence of
the law. Everything else was gloss. While I would not have dis-
agreed (I didn't) with Sam at the time, it was only after several more
years on the bench that I came to appreciate fully the force in Sam's
exaggerated brevity.145
e. The Effect on the Level of Litigation
Each of the qualities of Delaware corporate law that we discussed
has the effect of increasing the level of Delaware litigation. Because
the law is fact intensive, there are many potential factual disputes that
need to be resolved though litigation. Because the law is standard
based and there is uncertainty about which test applies, litigation may
ensue even absent factual disputes. 146 And because the precedents
are narrow, uncertainties are slowly resolved.
We are aware of the challenge in suggesting that Delaware's re-
nowned legal system is not as clear as it could be-although we note
that even Vice Chancellor Leo Strine, who otherwise takes issue with
our thesis, agrees that "in many ways Delaware law is less than opti-
mally clear."' 47 While it is not our intention to endorse any specific
change in Delaware law, we wish to point out some ingredients that
would render Delaware law more predictable. For one, Delaware law
145 Interview with William T. Allen, in New York, N.Y. (Mar. 2000).
146 Legal uncertainty leads to disagreement between litigants and to more disputes
proceeding to trial without settling. See Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic
Analysis of LegalDisputes and Their Resolution, 27J. EcoN. LiT. 1067, 1092 (1989); Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEthAL S ruD.
399 (1973); Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative
Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 63 & n.36 (1982).
147 Strine, supra note 144, at 1265.
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could accord a greater role to shareholders. For example, Dela-are
law could require a shareholder vote when a company receives an un-
solicited tender offer,' 48 or require shareholder approval for certain
self-dealing transactions. 149 Even where Delaware law retained flexi-
ble standards, the standards could be rendered more determinate by
employing presumptions or safe harbors or by limiting or prioritizing
the criteria to their application. 150 Any of these devices could be
adopted either in case law or in statutes and could provide more pre-
dictability than in the present system without increasing its complex-
ity.15 1 We present them here not as our proposed alternatives to
Delaware law-to do so is unwarranted for purposes of our analysis-
but simply to illustrate that alternatives do exist, both in commentary
and in actual use.152
148 A similar rule governs takeovers in the United Kingdom. Ste TiE Cr1V CODE oN
TAKxovs AND MERGERS § B(7), rerinted in P.F.C. BEGG, CO~miOtTE AcQvtsmo.Ns AN
MERGERS app. 7 at A7.4 (3d ed. 1998); see also Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 1, at 1190-93
(praising the clarity of the United Kingdom rule and contrasting it ith the uncertainty
resulting from Delaware's takeover jurisprudence). Indeed, thanks to that legal environ-
ment, takeovers occur in the United Kingdom regularly ith much less litigation than in
the United States. See Jeffrey Sheban, Taleover Caine Is Placd in Britain 117th Rules That
Would Halt US. Deals, WA ST. J., Nov. 3, 1989, at B5E.
149 A similar rule governs self-dealing transactions of public corporations in Canada
and the United Kingdom. See supra note 133.
150 See Kaplow, supra note 119, at 600. For an example of die potential use of presump-
tions, compare Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 (Del. 1984) (holding tlt even a 47%
shareholder may be deemed a noncontrolling shareholder), with kt t % Lw br.,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOvERNANCE ANALvsIS AND RECOMNuiEN'DX'roNs § 1.10(b) (1994)
(providing that holding 25% of the voting power creates a presumption of control). For
an example of the potential use of safe harbors, compare DEL. CODE A:,.x. tit. 8, § 271 (a)
(1991) (providing that shareholder approval is required for sale of "all or substantially all"
assets of the firm), with the Revised Model Business Corporation Act, REvtas MODu. Bus.
CoRP. Acr § 12.02(a) (1999) (providing that shareholder approval is not required when
the corporation retains at least 25% of total assets and 25% of either income before taxes
or revenues from continuing operations for that fiscal year). According to the Official
Comment to the Revised Model Business Corporation Act, the safe harbor 'represents a
policyjudgment that a greater measure of certainty than is provided by interpretations of
the current case law is highly desirable," and "[t]he application of this bright-line safe-
harbor test should, in most cases, produce a reasonably clear result substantially in con-
formity with the approaches taken in the better case developing the 'quantitative' and the
'qualitative' analyses." Id. § 12.02(a), cmt. 1 (1999).
151 For discussion of why standards are not synonymous with simplicity and rules are
not synonymous with complexity, see Kaplow, supra note 119, at 586-90.
152 To be sure, none of these alternatives would, in Vice Chancellor Strine's words,
generate a consensus among American corporate law practitioners and commentators."
Strine, supra note 144, at 1267, 1270 (mentioning lack of consensus in some areas of Dela-
ware corporate law as driving litigation intensiveness). Neither, however, does Delaare's
current approach. Judicial and legislative lawmaking is an easy task when a consensus
exists. We thus agree with Vice Chancellor Strine that Delaware law is litigation intensive
primarily "in areas where there is no consensus among its constituency." Id. at 1268. The
absence of a consensus, however, neither requires the law to be litigation intensive nor
implies that litigation intensiveness is optimal.
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2. Litigation-Intensive Law and Price Discrimination
We shall now explain why Delaware's litigation-intensive law re-
sults in price discrimination. First, we argue that the cost of the in-
creased level of litigation falls primarily on companies that derive the
highest value from incorporating in Delaware. We then examine how
this price-discriminatory incidence affects Delaware's profits and its
incentives to modify its legal system. Finally, we argue that cost differ-
ences do not account for the different charges that Delaware's litiga-
tion-intensive law imposes on firms.
a. The Incidence of Litigation-Related Costs
The costs of a litigation-intensive system fall primarily on Dela-
ware corporations that participate in the kind of activities that tend to
give rise to legal disputes.'5 3 To the extent that these companies are
involved in litigation, they directly bear the costs of a more litigation-
intensive corporate law. But even if they are not involved in litigation,
these companies may suffer costs associated with planning transac-
tions to avoid lawsuits, forgoing business opportunities, or making
flawed business decisions due to uncertainty. 154
Companies that are involved in litigation or undertake transac-
tions that may result in litigation are the ones assigning the highest
value to incorporating in Delaware. These companies gain most from
the fact that Delaware law, though litigation intensive, offers a higher
quality judiciary, a better developed case law, and more readily availa-
ble legal advice than any other states' laws.155
153 We view the incidence of litigation-related costs as third-degree, rather than sec-
ond-degree, price discrimination because, as in the case of the franchise tax, it would be
much too costly for firms to forgo the transactions that expose them to litigation. For a
similar analysis of Delaware's franchise tax discrimination, see supra note 55. The choice
of the level of litigation intensiveness is analogous to quality choice. Indeed, the economic
literature views quality choice as a price discrimination tool, particularly with respect to
second-degree price discrimination. See, e.g., Mussa & Rosen, supra note 51. This logic,
however, applies to third-degree price discrimination as well. Producers with market
power choose the quality of their product to maximize profits, where higher quality means
a higher price (or higher prices, in the case of a price discriminating producer), but also
higher costs. See TiRotE, supra note 45, at 149-50 (discussing quality discrimination). The
litigation gains that Delaware would lose if it made its law less litigation intensive are simi-
lar to the higher costs that a producer would incur in improving the quality of its product.
Delaware's lost gains from firms that use the law a lot would be higher than its lost gains
from firms that use the law only a little because the lower rate of litigation would affect the
former firms more than the latter. Similarly, a producer's cost of improving the quality of
the product it sells to high-demand consumers would be higher than its cost of improving
the quality of the product it sells to low-demand consumers because the former consumers
consume more.
154 See Kamar, supra note 119, at 892-96; Klausner, supra note 1, at 777; Romano, supra
note 1, at 277-78.
155 In a litigation-oriented system (as opposed to a system based on regulation or pri-
vate ordering), involvement in litigation reflects firms' use of the law. The level of litiga-
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The discriminatory incidence of the costs of litigation-intensive
law is not affected by the presence of liability insurance, by a com-
pany's inability to predict whether it will be involved in corporate dis-
putes, by Delaware's price-discriminatory franchise tax, or by the
availability of alternative, possibly more effective, devices to price dis-
criminate on the basis of involvement in disputes.
Directors' and officers' liability insurance would neutralize the
discriminatory effect of Delaware's litigation-intensive legal system
only if all companies paid the same premiums and insurance covered
all expenses generated by the system. If that were the case, all compa-
nies would bear the same cost of involvement in legal disputes-the
uniform insurance rate-regardless of their actual involvement in dis-
putes. In reality, however, premiums are higher for companies that
are frequently involved in litigation.'' 6 Moreover, liability insurance
covers only a portion of the legal fees and covers none of the in-
creased planning costs, the costs of a constrained ability to achieve
business goals, the costs of special litigation committees, or the costs
of managerial time spent in defending against lawsuits.' 57
Similarly, our argument does not hinge on the ability of compa-
nies to predict the extent to which they will be involved in corporate
disputes. If a company is involved in fewer disputes than it anticipates,
it will realize lower benefits from incorporating in Delaware. Such a
company, however, will not bear the cost of Delaware's litigation-in-
tensive law. Correspondingly, if a company is involved in more dis-
putes than anticipated, it will bear higher costs, but also derive greater
benefits.
The price-discriminatory effect of a litigation-intensive legal struc-
ture remains even after taking account of Delaware's franchise tax
which, as we have argued, imposes higher charges on companies that
are more likely to be involved in litigation. 5 s The proxies that Dela-
don is determined by the extent to which the law generally fosters litigation and by the
propensity of individual firms to be involved in lausuits. If Delaware law vwas less litigation
intensive, but still litigation oriented, the same firms would demonstrate a higher inci-
dence of involvement in lawsuits than others as today, but the general level of litigation
would be lower.
156 See Litigation Survey, supra note 100.
157 Insurance policies contain deductibles, limits, and exclusions for dishonesty, acts
that personally benefitted the defendant, and occasionally for takeover litigation. SreK.,r-
PER & BAiLY, supra note 100, §§ 24-10, 25-3, 25-12, 25-23. Insurers rely on these deduct-
ibles, limits, and exclusions to pay only part of the costs of lawsuits. See id. § 21-1.
Moreover, insurance policies only cover directors and officers, and persons related to
them. See id. § 24-3. Thus, in cases where a controlling shareholder is sued, such as freeze-
out cases, insurers allocate the costs between covered directors and officers and uncovered
controlling shareholders. See id. § 24-5, at 401.
158 See supra Part HA It is fairly evident that the reverse is also true, namely that
Delaware's franchise tax enhances overall price discrimination even though Delayware al-
ready unintentionally discriminates among companies through its litigation-intensive law.
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ware uses for assessing its franchise tax-the number of authorized
shares and APVC-track the involvement in corporate disputes only
imperfectly. By contrast, the costs resulting from litigation-intensive
law directly track involvement in corporate disputes. The costs of
such law thus fall mainly on firms that derive the greatest benefits, net
of their franchise taxes, from incorporating in Delaware.'t 9
Finally, we make no claim that litigation-intensive law is the most
effective way to use involvement in disputes as a basis for price dis-
crimination. It is possible that court filing fees, 160 taxes on legal ser-
vices, charges for use of judicial time, or similar devices would be
more effective.' 61 Delaware officials have probably never analyzed the
Franchise taxes are an efficient way for Delaware to profit from incorporations: all of tie
franchise-tax revenues benefit Delaware, and Delaware's costs in collecting the tax and
providing incorporation-related services are small. By contrast, a significant portion of the
costs that companies incur in conducting corporate litigation benefits out-of-state parties
(such as New York lawyers who often represent companies in corporate litigation, invest-
ment banks, liability insurance carriers, and expert witnesses), or no one at all (as in the
case of missed business opportunities or other costly business decisions made under legal
uncertainty, or in the case of risk-bearing costs that corporate fiduciaries bear under legal
uncertainty and pass on to shareholders). Moreover, of the revenues from corporate litiga-
tion that do stay in Delaware, only a fraction represents profits.
159 Franchise-tax discrimination, however, by at least imperfectly tracking the likeli-
hood of being involved in corporate disputes, reduces the correlation between the inci-
dence of litigation-intensive law and net benefits from a Delaware incorporation, and thus
reduces the incentives to engage in price discrimination through litigation-intensive law.
160 Delaware does not charge significant court fees to corporate litigants. The fee for a
new civil action with three or more defendants, which is the category under which most
corporate lawsuits fall, is $200; the fee for filing and recording any pleading is $1 per page,
up to a maximum of $50. DEE. CH. R. § 3 (2001).
161 Some of these devices suffer from shortcomings that may undermine their utility.
Court fees, for example, are at least initially borne by plaintiffs, not by Delaware's corpo-
rate consumers. Moreover, these fees could induce plaintiffs to sue in other courts (or not
to sue at all) and eliminate any profits for Delaware from these suits. Additionally, political
opposition by the corporate bar would make it difficult for Delaware to raise fees while
lowering the level of litigation. Finally, litigation intensiveness enhances Delaware's lead.
The dependence of Delaware law on litigation prevents other states from successfully emu-
lating the law, while ensuring that the state's courts maintain their expertise and update
the state's stock of corporate legal precedents. All of these are the basis for Delaware's
continued ability to price discriminate and, indeed, to charge any premium for its law. See
Kamar, supra note 10.
Litigation intensiveness is different. Litigation intensiveness means that plaintiffs
more frequently have viable claims to bring to the court, which, in the absence of signifi-
cant court fees, are relatively inexpensive to file. Indeed, Delaware law does not require a
security for expenses, thus ensuring that the cost of filing the claim is low. ary, supra note
1, at 686; Macey & Miller, supra note 8, at 511. Although litigation intensiveness can in-
crease the cost to plaintiffs of pursuing their claims in court, the higher cost does not
reduce litigation because it imposes higher costs on defendants (whose work is disrupted
by time-consuming and personally unpleasant depositions and compliance with discovery
requests) and is therefore likely to increase the settlement value of legal claims. See Lucian
Arye Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17J. LEGAL.. STUD. 437 (1988); David
Rosenberg & Stephen Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5
INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 3 (1985). In addition to entrepreneurial corporate litigation, hostile
bidders bring some corporate lawsuits in the course of battles for corporate control. The
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best method to price discriminate on the basis of involvement in dis-
putes, and they may not even be conscious of the price-discriminatory
impact of Delaware law. Those officials would, however, respond to
public companies leaving Delaware because of dissatisfaction ith its
law. Since the cost of litigation-intensive law falls predominantly on
companies that derive high net benefits from incorporating in Dela-
ware, excessive litigation intensiveness does not result in such migra-
tion. This is true regardless of whether litigation-intensive law is the
best way to price discriminate.
b. Delaware's Incentives to Structure Its Corporate Law
The fact that the costs of a litigation-intensive legal system fall
primarily on companies deriving high net benefits from incorporating
in Delaware results in insufficient incentives for Delaware to make its
law less litigation intensive when doing so would improve the quality
of the law. 162 From a social perspective, the value of any such im-
provement depends on its value to the average Delaware company.
But Delaware's economic incentive to offer improvements depends on
its ability to charge a higher price for the improved law. This ability in
stakes for the plaintiffs in this type of lawsuit are significantly higher than their costs of
going to trial, especially given that courts conduct these trials in an expedited manner. Se
In re Dunkin' Donuts S'holders Litig., 16 DELJ. Coap. L 1443, 145861 (1991) (Del. Ch.
Nov. 27, 1990) (relying on that reasoning to deny a losing hostile bidder's motion for trial
counsel fees and expenses).
162 Although we argue that the price-discriminatory effect reduces Delaware's incen-
tive to make its law less litigation intensive, other factors e.-plain why aspects of Delaware
law start off being excessively litigation intensive. In addition to random imperfections in
the law, these factors may include the fact that corporate adjudication in Delaware takes
place in a court of equity, whose inclination not to limitjudicial discretion is part of its
legacy. See, eg., In re Holly Farms Corp. S'holders Litig., 564 A.2d 342, 348 (Del. Ch. 1989)
("The Court of Chancery has historically been vested with considerable discretion in deli-
cately balancing all the equities and, although some might desire a more definite standard,
no hard and fast rule is likely or desirable which vill apply to all factual circumstances.");
William T. Allen, A Bicentennial Toast to t1w Delaware Court of Chanten, 1792-1992, 48 Bus.
LAw. 363, 365 (1992) ("The strong identification of the judges of the Court of Chancery
with the historic role of chancery, had, I think, subtle but real effects on thejurisprudence
of the court over its long life."); Maurice A. Hartnett, III, The History of the Delaware Court of
Chancey, 48 Bus. Lkw. 367, 369 (1992) ("Some of us believe that the[ ] maxims of equity,
although not so often quoted now, are as important today as ever."); William T. Quillen &
Michael Hanrahan, A Short Histo of 11w Delaware Court of Chanery.-1792-1992 18 DE.. J.
ConP. L 819, 821-22 (1993) ("Equity is the flexible application of broad moral principles
(maxims) to fact specific situations for the sake of justice. Delaware has preserved the
essence."). For a well-known example of a Delaware decision reversing previous case law to
expand judicial discretion, see Paramount Comnunications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140,
1153 (Del. 1990) (rejecting previous case law on the proportionality test as unduly restric-
tive ofjudicial discretion). Vice Chancellor Strine mentions additional reasons why Dela-
ware law may be excessively litigation intensive, such as constituent pressures and
institutional rivalries. Strine, supra note 144, at 1270-72. Our argument is consistent with
any of these explanations. We would add to them, however, that tie price-discriminatory
incidence of litigation-intensive law makes it less costly for Delaware to offer such law even
if Delaware corporations would prefer the law to be less litigation intensive.
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turn depends on the value of the improvement to the marginal Dela-
ware company, which is the company whose net benefits from incor-
porating in Delaware approach zero. 163 Because Delaware law has a
price-discriminatory incidence, however, the marginal company
would benefit from such an improvement less than the average com-
pany.16' Delaware would thus not be able to raise its price by an
amount commensurate with the social benefits of improved law.
Aggravating these insufficient incentives to reduce the level of liti-
gation are a number of benefits that Delaware derives from litigation.
Though costly for firms, lawsuits benefit Delaware. Increased corpo-
rate litigation stimulates Delaware's economy. Because Delaware is
the incorporation state of choice for public companies, Wilmington-
Delaware's largest city-has become home to some of the nation's
most respected law firms. These law firms derive substantial revenues
from representing and advising clients in corporate disputes and in
transactions that are susceptible to becoming the subject of corporate
disputes. These revenues in turn fund salaries of associates and sup-
port staff, pay for office space and supplies, and remunerate partners.
All of this economic activity directly generates revenues for Delaware's
personal income tax, corporate income tax, and business and occupa-
tional gross receipts tax. 165 It also generates revenues indirectly as
lawyers, employees, and suppliers spend their income in Delaware.
The corporate litigation business, of course, also generates in-
come for lawyers and other providers of litigation-related services. In-
deed, probably because of the prevalence of corporate lawyers, the
average annual income of Delaware lawyers ($117,276 in 1990) is
higher, even before adjusting for differences in the cost of living, than
that of lawyers in such metropolitan hubs as New York ($111,572),
Washington, D.C. ($92,259), or Chicago ($90,722).166
163 See TIROLE, supra note 45, at 101 (noting the difference between the social value of
quality, which relates to the average consumer's valuation of quality changes, and the mo-
nopolist's value of quality, which relates to the marginal consumer's valuation of quality
changes). Because Delaware charges different franchise taxes to different firms, a margi-
nal Delaware company exists in each franchise-tax bracket. However, within each bracket,
a marginal company would benefit less from an improvement that makes the law less litiga-
tion intensive than the average company in that bracket.
164 Correspondingly, the marginal company benefits more than the average company
from an improvement that makes the law more litigation intensive. Delaware thus has
socially excessive incentives to institute such improvements.
165 As of 2000, Delaware's personal income-tax rate ranged from 0 to 6.4%. Dela-
ware's corporate income-tax rate was 8.7% (assessed on net income derived from business
activities or property in Delaware). Delaware's business and occupational gross receipts tax
rate ranged from 0.096% to 1.92%. Office of the Governor, State of Del., Financial Over-
view Fiscal Year 2001 (Jan. 31, 2000), at http://vv.state.de.us/budget/fy2001/fy2001-me-
dia-package.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2001).
166 Gov't Info. Sharing Project, Or. State Univ., Earnings by Occupation and Education:
1990 (compiling data provided by the United States Bureau of the Census et al.), at http://
govinfo.library.orstedu/earn-stateis.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2001).
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To be sure, unless Delaware's corporate lawyers have market
power, the people who are now Delaware lawyers could obtain an
equivalent income in a different employ or at a different location.'67
But even in the absence of market power, a drop in the level of litiga-
tion could impose substantial losses. Some providers of litigation-re-
lated services have made over the years specific investments in their
work that they would lose if they had to change their occupation or
location.168 In addition, many Delaware residents would face substan-
tial transaction and relocation costs-such as the costs of selling one's
home, moving one's family, and enduring temporary unemploy-
ment-if they had to changejobs.'6 9 Similarly, until additional corpo-
rate litigators enter practice in Delaware, an increase in the level of
litigation would raise income for Delaware lawyers. 170
The benefits that Delaware residents derive from a thriving litiga-
tion industry are difficult to quantify. Pennsylvania's recent efforts to
establish a chancery court with expert judges and jurisdiction con-
fined to corporate and business disputes gives some indication, how-
ever, that these benefits are material.' 7 ' An avowed aim of this
endeavor was to compete with Delaware for incorporations.'7 But
Pennsylvania would not have derived significant franchise taxes from
167 Several factors suggest that Delaw-re corporate law firms may have market power.
A small number of Delaware firms dominate the local bar. Until recently, only these firms
had extensive files containing unpublished letter rulings by the Dela%-are Chancery Court.
These firms have also developed a reputation for quality and knowledge of the localjudid-
ary that new entrants may find difficult to match.
168 Romano, supra note 1, at 276.
169 The presence of these benefits also strengthens Delaare's commitment to re-
sponding to corporate needs because the groups of citizens that benefit from Delaware
incorporations will favor such responsiveness. See Kamar, supra note 10, at 1936. In addi-
tion, these benefits induce Delawrre corporate lawyers to provide free services to the state
to keep Delaware's corporate law current. SeeS. Samuel Arsht, A Histoiy ofDelaware Corpora.
tion Law, I DEI_ J. CoRP. L 1, 17-21 (1976) (describing the work of the Delaware Bar
Association Standing Committee on the General Corporation Law).
170 In addition to benefits accruing to Delaware residents, and from them to the entire
state through taxation, fact-intensive and standard-based law also bolsters Delaw re's mar-
ket power. It is hard for other states to replicate such law and to tap Delaware's network
and learning benefits. See Kamar, supra note 10, at 1928-32. Furthermore, the incompati-
bility of Delaware law with other laws raises migration costs for the many corporations that
are already incorporated in Delaware. Id. at 1937. Other states cannot respond by offering
clearer laws because that would cost them in losing the appeal of at least partial compatibil-
ity with a leading standard and, if they nevertheless succeed in attracting incorporations,
would expose them to emulation by other states. Id. at 1938.
171 John . Kennedy, Chancery Court Proposal Sent to Full Senate, PA. L. Wmyx, May 17,
1993, at 6; Thomas A. Slowey, Pa. Chaneery Court Is a Sound Proposal PA. L WMx, May 2,
1994, at 6. The legislation was never enacted, at least in part due to political opposition to
merit-based selection ofjudges. Id. A revised proposal to create a specialized commercial
(as opposed to corporate) court is still pending, but is not seen as an effort to attract
incorporations. Telephone Interview with William H. Clark, head of the Pennsylvania
chancery court coalition (June 1999) [hereinafter Clark Interview].
172 Clark Interview, supra note 171.
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such incorporations. 173 And while Pennsylvania law firms actively sup-
ported the chancery court proposal, the Pennsylvania Treasury re-
mained indifferent. 74 This suggests that the benefits from additional
litigation-related business, not those from additional franchise-tax rev-
enues, motivated the chancery court proposal.175
Our argument regarding Delaware's incentives does not depend
on whether litigation-intensive law in fact benefits Delaware as a whole
or whether-as Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller have argued-
Delaware's influential corporate bar induces the adoption and reten-
tion of laws that increase its rents while being detrimental to the state
as a whole. 176 Even under the latter conception, the Delaware corpo-
rate bar has to expend political capital to pass laws that stimulate liti-
gation but reduce Delaware's franchise-tax revenues. The price-
discriminatory incidence of litigation-intensive law implies that the
franchise-tax impact of this law is less than it would be if its incidence
were neutral. Consequently, less influence is needed to induce Dela-
ware to offer litigation-intensive law.' 77 Our analysis thus explains why
the Delaware bar may have been successful in maintaining a litigation-
intensive corporate law.
c. Why Cost Differences Do Not Account for Price Differences
The differences in rents that Delaware extracts from firms
through litigation do not merely reflect differences in costs. To be
sure, it is possible that the gain that Delaware derives from each hour
its judges spend on corporate litigation is the same regardless of the
corporation involved. Although Delaware extracts higher gains from
firms that are more involved in litigation than from firms that are less
so involved, it would seem that these gains merely reflect higher costs
of serving these firms, not different premiums.
173 Pennsylvania's annual franchise tax depends on where a company's property is lo-
cated, where its sales are made, and where its employees are based, rather than where it is
incorporated. TAx GUIDE, supra note 56, 5 5-771. There is no indication that Pennsylvania
was planning to change its franchise-tax system.
174 Clark Interview, supra note 170; Clifford E. Haines, A Chancery Court CouldAssist Pa,,
PHiLA. Bus. J., Mar. 28, 1997, available at http://vw.amcity.com/philadelphia/stories/
1997/03/31/editoia3.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2001); Board of Governors of the Phia-
delphia Bar Association Resolution of April 24, 1997, Support for Legislation Crealing a Corn-
merce Court in Pennsylvania, at http://ww.philadelphiabar.org/member/governance/
resolutions/resolution.asp?pubid=1741502222000 (last visited Mar. 20, 2001).
175 Cf. Romano, supra note 1, at 241 (arguing that the income to Delaware residents
from servicing Delaware corporations considerably exceeds franchise-tax collections). Of
course, the lack of direct fiscal benefits to Pennsylvania from the chancery court proposal
may have accounted for its failure.
176 See Macey & Miller, supra note 8, at 491-98.
177 Cf. Kamar, supra note 10, at 1939-40 (arguing that the bar's influence in promoting
Delaware's litigation intensiveness is consistent with the argument that litigation intensive-
ness is essential for Delaware's competitive advantages).
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This reasoning, however, fails to take into account that the level
of litigation itself is the result of Delaware's product design. Assume,
for example, that Delaware offered a law that generated very little liti-
gation. This type of a legal system would impose on all firms virtually
the same cost of being incorporated in Delaware, even though differ-
ent firms would obtain different net benefits from being incorporated
in Delaware. Compared to such a system, a litigation-intensive law im-
poses higher costs on firms that benefit more from incorporating in
Delaware. Litigation intensiveness thus functions as a metering de-
vice-metering not the consumption of litigation services (the need
for which would be lower in a less litigation-intensive regime), but
rather the need to resort to law to resolve disputes (which, in a less
litigation-intensive regime, would be resolved without litigation). 178
By analogy, if publishers were able to charge a double price to readers
who read their books twice, no one would argue that they price their
product by the unit. After all, they would sell only one book to each
reader. Delaware is doing just that, the only difference being that the
method it uses to gauge firms' benefit from its legal system-litigation
intensiveness-is costly to Delaware. 79
Moreover, litigation services are not a separate product that Dela-
ware sells. Delaware does not allow firms to choose how much of its
substantive law to buy and, separately, how much of its litigation ser-
vices to buy. Rather, firms buy a package that includes substantive law,
litigation services, and administrative services. There are many ways of
structuring such a package. The package that Delaware offers comes
with litigation-intensive substantive law, which affects some firms more
than others. An optimal corporate-law package would probably con-
tain some litigation, and firms would probably prefer to have Dela-
ware courts handle that litigation. But Delaware's package seems to
contain more litigation than is optimal, and thus to compel firms that
178 The use of litigation intensiveness as a metering device is consistent uith our analy -
sis of litigation intensiveness as third-degree price discrimination. Third-degree price dis-
crimination differs from second-degree price discrimination in that the producer offers
products at different prices to different consumer groups, rather than letting consumers
choose from a menu of different products at different prices. ,e supra notes 47-51 and
accompanying text. Delaware firms do not choose their level of involvement in litigation
in any meaningful way. To be sure, they can forgo public equity offerings or mergers and
acquisitions to reduce their exposure to litigation, but these options are too costly for them
(just as it would be too costly for anyone to become a student only to enjoy student dis-
counts in museums). For a similar example of using metering for third-degree price dis-
crimination, see C. RLTOz & PE.RLoF, supra note 18, at 476-79.
179 The costliness to producers of price-discrimination devices is not only common,
but perhaps unavoidable given the need to treat different consumers differently and forgo
scale economies in consumer handling. Even printing special discount tickets for students
and inspecting student identification documents at a museum entrance is costly. Museums




prefer the services of Delaware's expert judiciary to use them more
than they would ideally like. The fact that it is Delaware courts that
handle the excess litigation mitigates the firms' loss from that excess,
but does not turn it into a gain. Firms nevertheless incorporate in
Delaware because they are still better off than they would be by incor-
porating in other states with courts of lesser quality.
III
EFFICIENCY EFFECTS OF PRICE DIsCRIMINATION
Our analysis so far has focused on how Delaware gains from price
discrimination. It has not addressed the social desirability of price dis-
crimination, which depends on the aggregate benefits of price dis-
crimination to Delaware and to corporations. Below we shall analyze
separately the efficiency effects of franchise-tax price discrimination
and of price discrimination through litigation-intensive law.
A. Franchise-Tax Price Discrimination
From an economic standpoint, the taxes that firms pay to Dela-
ware represent pure wealth transfers and so do not affect social wel-
fare. Tax discrimination, however, implicates social welfare insofar as
it affects which firms incorporate in Delaware. Compared to a uni-
form monopoly tax rate, tax discrimination enhances social welfare to
the extent that it causes firms to incorporate in Delaware, whose law,
even if suboptimal, is still superior to the laws of other states. Con-
versely, tax discrimination reduces social welfare to the extent that it
causes firms that would benefit from incorporating in Delaware to in-
corporate elsewhere.' s0 In theory, either effect can dominate,"8 '
To determine the net welfare effect of tax discrimination, one has
to assess what uniform tax Delaware would charge if it did not discrim-
inate. Any intermediate uniform tax between the current maximum
of $150,000 per year and the current minimum of $30 per year would
both lead some non-Delaware firms that would be assessed a lower tax
under a uniform structure than under a discriminatory one to enter
Delaware, and some Delaware firms that would be assessed a higher
tax to exit Delaware. The higher the uniform tax, the stronger is the
latter effect relative to the former and the more likely it is that tax
discrimination enhances social welfare. 182
180 Current Delaware firms that would remain in the state under the hypothetical uni-
form tax have no effect on social welfare. These firms would merely share with Delaware a
different portion of their consumer surplus than they do today.
181 The two effects would cancel out only if all finns had a linear demand for Delaware
law. SeeTRoLE, supra note 45, at 139. There is, of course, no reason to expect this particu-
lar shape of demand to represent reality.
182 Increasing the number of Delaware firms by reducing franchise taxes is likely to be
desirable regardless of whether Delaware law favors managers or shareholders. Firms
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Table 3 presents a stratified report of Delaware's franchise-tax
revenues. As Table 3 shows, approximately 1600 Delaware firms pay
annual franchise taxes of $100,000 or more. Even assuming that all
firms presently paying less than $100,000 would exit Delaware if it
charged a uniform tax rate of $100,000, Delaware's franchise-tax reve-
nues at that rate would still be $160 million.
TABLE 3: DEuAWA FRANCHISE TAX RECEIPTS IN FiscAL
YEARS 1997-1999
Tax Paid in Fiscal Tax Paid in Fiscal Tax Paid in Fiscal
Year 1999 Year 1998 Year 1997
Tax Rate in Number Revenue Number Revenue Number Revenue
Dollars of Firms in Dollars of Firms in Dollars of Firms in Dollars
0-29 3,564 64,710 3,738 67,444 3,177 56,567
30-49 147,805 4,453,728 147,825 4,478,737 140,586 4,237,122
50-99 38,382 2,996,688 36,481 2,837,385 36.025 2,804,836
100-499 22,088 4,057,405 22,055 4,048,526 21,472 3,898.617
500-999 4,565 2,910,072 4,257 2,722,380 4,122 2,616,643
1,000-4,999 5,218 11,848,680 5,018 11,232,215 4,713 10,619,127
5,000-9,999 1,765 12,312,147 1,745 12,233,360 1,537 10,707,414
10,000-19,999 1,518 21,243,842 1,418 19,866,212 1,347 18.777,100
20,000-49,999 1,513 48,190,673 1,510 48,485,448 1,391 44,293,327
50,000-99,999 916 64,382,041 906 63,631,498 777 54,330,119
100,000-109,999 107 11,180,387 108 11,261,048 101 10,573309
110,000-119,999 98 11,243,290 75 8,599,461 77 8.810,424
120,000-129,999 83 10,383,007 61 7,600,478 57 7,139,400
130,000-139,999 67 9,036,466 62 8,359,901 60 8,079,925
140,000-149,999 97 14,096,328 63 9,208,731 66 9,678,761
150,000 or more 1,229 196,269,956 1,315 173,840,354 1,172 152,030,939
Others 254 -306,375 0 0 0 0
Total 229,249 424,363,045 226,637 388,473,178 216,680 348,653,680
Figures include interest payments and penalties.
Source: Delaware Division of Corporations
To earn similar revenues from a uniform low rate, for instance, in
the $30 to $500 range, Delaware would have to induce a large net
inflow of incorporations. Table 3 confirms, however, our assessment
that nonpublic corporations can presently incorporate in Delaware by
paying the minimum rate of $30 (the rate most Delaware firms
pay).183 Nonpublic firms are thus not a major source of entry into
Delaware-indeed, some would presumably exit if Delaware charged
more than $30. While some public firms might enter Delaware if it
lowered its fees, their number would be rather limited. It is therefore
unlikely that Delaware could charge a uniform rate that would attract
choosing Delaware over states less protective of shareholders gain both from better share-
holder protection and from the improved services that Delaiare offers. Firms choosing
Delaware over states more protective of shareholders do so because their decision makers,
whose choice of a pro-shareholderjurisdiction when Delaware franchise Laxes were higher
indicates their alignment with shareholders, believe that the superior services offered by
Delaware outweigh its inferior protection of shareholders.
183 See supra note 68 and accompan)ing text.
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additional incorporations sufficient to yield $160 million in reve-
nues. 84 Thus, if Delaware had to choose between setting a low rate
(and keeping many nonpublic firms), and setting a high rate (and
losing them), the profit-maximizing choice would likely be the latter.
Tax discrimination between public and nonpublic firms therefore
probably enhances social welfare. 185
B. Price Discrimination Through Increased Litigation
Assessing the social-welfare implications of Delaware's litigation-
intensive law warrants consideration of additional effects. Unlike
franchise-tax discrimination, price discrimination through litigation-
intensive law also affects the very quality of the product that Delaware
is selling. As we have explained above, to the extent that price dis-
crimination shapes Delaware law, it likely reduces social welfare.""'
Among other things, the ensuing litigation intensiveness may increase
the cost of business planning and litigation, the cost of risk-bearing by
corporate managers, and the cost of suboptimal decisions by corpo-
rate decision makers. 187
C. Implications for the Incorporation Debate
It is difficult to write about the market for corporate law today
without addressing the much debated question of whether the ability
of firms to choose their corporate law by choosing where to incorpo-
rate is desirable. The thesis we have presented is compatible both
with the view that it is desirable and the view that it is not.""8 A free-
dom to choose a corporate law through incorporation is desirable if
incorporators favor substantive laws that afford optimal protection to
shareholder interests; it is undesirable if they favor substantive laws
that grant managers excessive freedom to pursue their own interests.
Either way, Delaware has competitive advantages in the market
for incorporations because it not only tailors its law to incorporators'
preferences, but also offers excellent adjudication and administrative
services, extensive precedents, familiarity to the legal and financial
184 This analysis ignores the fact that the number of Delaware corporations may in
itself, through network and learning effects, affect the value of incorporating in Delaware.
Other things being equal, this effect will reduce the profit-maximizing uniform tax that
Delaware would charge for an incorporation.
185 Whether the different franchise taxes payable by different public firms, assuming
that the taxes are price discriminatory, enhance social welfare is more difficult to assess.
Even though we can confidently conclude that Delaware would maximize its profits by
setting the uniform rate so high that nonpublic corporations would exit, the data are insuf-
ficient to predict how a uniform rate would affect incorporations by public companies.
The net social-welfare effect of price discrimination among public firms is thus ambiguous.
186 See supra Part II.B.2(b).
187 See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
188 Cf. Kamar, supra note 10, at 1948.
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community, and commitment to continued responsiveness. The value
of these advantages to firms is separate from the value of its substan-
tive law.'89 These advantages, in turn, confer market power on Dela-
ware-market power that Delaware uses to price discriminate and to
increase its profits. It is hard to determine the overall social-welfare
effect resulting from the likely positive effect of discrimination
through franchise tax and the likely negative effect of discrimination
through litigation intensiveness. The social-welfare implications of
price discrimination are clear, however, insofar as one focuses on the
criterion traditionally used to evaluate the market for incorpora-
tions-the quality of corporate law. Here price discrimination proba-
bly only makes the market for incorporations less desirable than it
seems to its proponents and more undesirable than it seems to its
opponents.190
CONCLUSION
This Article has challenged the received wisdom that the out-
come of a market for incorporations depends entirely on the degree
to which corporate decision makers are motivated to incorporate in
the jurisdiction that maximizes the value of the corporation. Against
this overly simplified description, we have argued that Delaware relies
on competitive advantages in the market for incorporations to in-
crease its profits through price discrimination.
Two features of Delaware law involve price discrimination. First,
Delaware's uniquely structured franchise tax results in higher charges
to public firms than to nonpublic firms. Public firms value incorpo-
rating in Delaware more highly than nonpublic firms. The different
franchise taxes payable by these firms, which are not based on cost
differences, constitute third-degree price discrimination.
Second, Delaware's substantive corporate law tends to be stan-
dard based and fact intensive, there is often ambiguity as to what legal
test is applicable, and precedents tends to be narrow in scope. Each
of these factors makes Delaware law litigation intensive. This quality
of the law also constitutes third-degree price discrimination because,
on one hand, the costs of incorporating in Delaware are higher for
companies that tend to be involved in legal disputes more than
189 SeeBebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 1, at 1174 (arguing that the value that sharehold-
ers reportedly assign to Delaware firms in comparison to firms incorporated in other states
may reflect the value of these advantages, rather than the adequacy of shareholder protec-
tion under Delaware law); Klausner, supra note 1, at 850-51.
190 Cf Kamar, supra note 10, at 1948 (making a similar argument regarding the effect
of legal indeterminacy that results from other uncompetitive practices iat Delam, are
employs).
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others, and on the other hand, these companies assign a higher value
to incorporating in Delaware.
Finally, we have examined the efficiency implications of Dela-
ware's price discrimination. We have argued that franchise-tax dis-
crimination between public and nonpublic firms is likely to enhance
social welfare. By contrast, the price discriminatory effect of litigation-
intensive law weakens Delaware's incentives to improve its law and is




STATES WITH No FRANCHISE TAXES OR ONLY FLAT
ANNUAL FEES
Tax to Domestic Tax to Foreign
State Firms in Dollars Finns in Dollars
















New Mexico 62.50 62.50
New York 4.50 4.50
North Dakota 25 25
Oregon 30 220





Source: State Tax Guide: All States 5-200 to 5-951 (CCH ed., 2001)
191 The actual tax is double the tax reported in the table and is shared biannually.
192 Includes $225 license fee in addition to the $75 filing fee. T,%x Gt'nu, supra note
56, 1-300.
193 Indudes $100 license fee in addition to the $25 filing fee. Id. 1 5-366, 5-370.
194 Foreign companies pay an additional fee based on the number of authorized or
issued shares. Id. 5-820.
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APPENDIX B
STATES WITH NoN-INcoME APPORTIONED ANNUAL
CoRPoRATE TAxEs
State Tax Base Apportionment Method
Alabama net worth property/payroll/sales
Arkansas outstanding capital stock real and tangible personal
property
Illinois paid-in capital 'represented in" Illinois
Kansas shareholders' equity "attributable to" Kansas
Kentucky capital property/payroll/sales
Louisiana capital stock, surplus, sales/property
undivided profits,
borrowed capital
Massachusetts tangible property or net manufacturing (and
worth defense): sales others:
property/payroll/sales
Mississippi capital property/gross receipts
Missouri outstanding shares and property/assets
surplus
Nevada number of employees full-time employees
New Hampshire enterprise value compensation/interest
(property)/sales
New Jersey net worth property/payroll/sales
North Carolina capital stock, surplus, property/payroll/sales
undivided profits
Ohio issued and outstanding property/payroll/sales
shares of stock




least 3 years after
issuance)
Pennsylvania capital stock property/payroll/sales
South Carolina capital stock and paid in manufacturers/dealers in




Tennessee property/net worth property/payroll/receipts
Texas capital and earned surplus gross receipts
Wyoming property/assets located and employed in
Wyoming
Source: State Tax Guide: All States 5-200 to 5-951, 10-522, 10-657, 10-730, 10-807
(CCH ed., 2001)
1256 [Vol. 86:1205
